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INTRODUCTION 
Today’s event is attended by many who spend a great deal of time thinking about 
intellectual property laws, especially their intersection with the entertainment 
industry and the arts.  There therefore may be few in the room who think they do not 
already know what the right of publicity is, or how its story began.  But, much of 
what you have thought, been taught, or have read turns out to be wrong.  This 
Lecture, along with my recently published book on the subject, The Right of 
Publicity:  Privacy Reimagined for a Public World, reveals a different origin story 
for the right of publicity.  The right of publicity did not emerge as something distinct 
from the right of privacy because of privacy law’s failings.  Instead, my research 
reveals that the right of privacy from the very beginning did much of what we 
consider today to be the work of the right of publicity.  Privacy-based claims 
provided both injunctive and monetary relief for public and private figures alike.  
The right of publicity is something we all have―it is a state law that gives a person 
the right to stop others from using our identities—particularly our names and 
likenesses without permission—usually for a defendant’s advantage.  It is recognized 
in at least thirty states across the United States.  In contrast to the right of privacy, 
which is mostly consistent across the more than forty states that recognize such a 
right under their tort laws, the right of publicity varies dramatically from state to state 
in terms of who is covered, what is covered, how the right can be infringed, and what 
sorts of uses are exempted from liability.1 
The right of publicity is not an absolute right.  It has long been limited by 
countervailing interests, such as those protected and furthered by the First 
Amendment.  The right has exploded in importance over the last few decades, 
exponentially growing in scope and the frequency with which it is asserted.  
Although right of publicity claims are often thought of as primarily protecting 
celebrity plaintiffs from unauthorized uses in advertisements, the right of publicity 
provides broader coverage in most states.  Many states allow anyone to bring claims, 
not only those who commercialize their identities for a living.2  Many states also 
allow claims in the context of noncommercial speech, including uses in news 
reporting, political campaigns, comic books, and video games.3  
 
 1. JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY:  PRIVACY REIMAGINED FOR A PUBLIC 
WORLD 96–98 (2018).  To facilitate the navigation of these disparate state right of publicity laws I created 
the website Rothman’s Roadmap to the Right of Publicity.  The website provides information about each 
state’s laws, as well as news about right of publicity cases, legislation, and scholarship.  It is accessible at 
www.rightofpublicityroadmap.com.  
 2. ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 96–98; see also Jennifer E. Rothman, Commercial Speech, 
Commercial Use, and the Intellectual Property Quagmire, 101 VA. L. REV. 1929, 1951–52 (2015). 
 3. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (allowing right of 
publicity claim in context of news broadcast); Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(allowing right of publicity claim in context of video game); Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp.2d 1073 
(C.D. Cal. 2009) (allowing right of publicity claim to proceed in context of political campaign ad); Porco 
v. Lifetime Entm’t Servs., 47 N.Y.S.3d 769 (App. Div. 2017) (allowing right of publicity claim under 
New York’s privacy statute in the context of a television docudrama); Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 
363 (Mo. 2003) (allowing multimillion-dollar verdict arising out of use of a hockey player’s name in a 
comic book); Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change v. Am. Heritage Prods., 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 
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Despite the right of publicity’s increasing prominence, much of the common 
wisdom and understanding of the right is historically inaccurate.  Today, courts and 
scholars often describe the right of publicity and the right of privacy as opposites, 
the right of publicity as the “reverse side of the coin of privacy.”4  But these two 
rights are far more similar and intertwined than is commonly thought.  They began 
as one and the same―the right of privacy was the original right of publicity, and was 
expressly recognized as a right to stop “unwarranted publicity” about oneself.5  It is 
said that something new was needed because privacy law failed to protect public 
figures who sought to commercialize their identities, but this claim turns out to be 
wrong.  Privacy law did protect public figures, including those who commercialized 
their personalities, and who claimed primarily economic harms for unauthorized 
uses.  There was one thing, however, that the right of privacy did not do―it could 
not be transferred―it was (and is) an inalienable right.  This meant that the right to 
a person’s identity could not be taken away from that person and transferred to a 
corporation or other third party.  As I will discuss, inalienability was an advantage 
of the privacy-based regime, rather than a liability.6  
In the context of this discussion, when I refer to the “right of privacy” I mean the 
first right of privacy recognized in the United States―the one that emerged as part 
of state tort laws in the late 1800s.  The right of privacy today means many different 
things in American law, from the protection of secrets, to data privacy, to spatial 
privacy, to decisional privacy (encompassing rights such as those to use 
contraceptives and to have an abortion).  Although privacy is often thought of as a 
constitutional right, the right of privacy initially developed under state tort laws for 
the same reasons asserted to justify today’s right of publicity―an interest in 
protecting individuals from having their names and likenesses used without 
permission.  It was this concern that led to the adoption of state privacy laws in the 
United States, more so than concerns over secrecy or intrusion into secluded 
locations.  Many states today recognize a right of privacy, either instead of an 
independent right of publicity, or in addition to one.  These privacy-based 
misappropriation claims protect against unauthorized uses of a person’s identity for 
a defendant’s advantage.7  
Sometimes we tell ourselves incorrect stories about the law, and how it got made 
or how it functions.  Sometimes this happens because of one or more mistakes that 
get repeated over time, or because of an agenda long forgotten.  Both are true in the 
context of the right of publicity.  Sometimes our misunderstanding of the past does 
not matter.  But when it comes to the right of publicity, longstanding mistakes about 
how the right came to be, and what its objectives are, greatly alter how we should 
think about and apply the law today. 
 
1982) (allowing right of publicity claim in context of mass-produced busts of Martin Luther King Jr.); see 
also ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 87–88; Rothman, supra note 2, at 1953–55. 
 4. See, e.g., Hirsch v. S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129 (Wis. 1979) (quoting Melville 
B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 204 (1954)).   
 5. ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 27–29; see also discussion infra nn.37–82 & accompanying text. 
 6. ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 11–50. 
 7. Id. at 3–5, 11–29. 
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Many of the missteps in right of publicity law have been driven by falsehoods 
repeated to the point of almost universal consensus and unassailability.  Part of the 
problem also has been that federal courts have taken a leading role in shaping and 
misshaping these state laws, often without being sufficiently familiar with the state 
law in the area.  This Lecture reveals the truth about the development of the right of 
publicity, and by so doing, provides a foundation for reforming the right going 
forward.  In particular, I will focus on one theme drawn from my larger book 
project―the right of publicity’s split from the right of privacy, and its turn toward 
being treated as a distinct intellectual property or quasi-IP right.  
The turn toward understanding the right of publicity as akin to a copyright or 
patent, as opposed to a right rooted in the individual identity-holder has created many 
of the challenges with today’s right of publicity laws.  The right of 
publicity―emboldened by its status as a form of IP―has expanded in ways that 
increasingly clash with free speech, and with the privileges provided by copyright 
law.  At the same time, its new-found IP status undercuts the ability of the First 
Amendment and copyright preemption to balance out the more expansive publicity 
laws.  The shift to the IP paradigm has also created another danger:  that the very 
individuals the right is supposed to protect could lose control of their own identities 
forever, thereby undermining the very basis for providing such a right in the first 
place.8 
Placing the right of publicity in the intellectual property pantheon has also severed 
its connections to the right of privacy.  This has problematically unmoored the right 
of publicity, sometimes leaving ordinary people without any remedy for wrongs 
committed against them.  At the same time, the shift has narrowed our understanding 
of privacy law.  Tort-based privacy law has turned into something small and literal, 
primarily limited to protecting secrets and seclusion.  This narrower view of privacy 
has led courts to sometimes ignore claims of emotional distress by public figures, 
and injuries arising out of the use of information (including images, videos, and audio 
 
 8. As I will discuss, from the beginning the right of privacy was sometimes understood as a 
property right, but as one inextricably attached to the underlying person.  See infra notes 83–92 & 
accompanying text.  So the shift to the IP framework was not a shift to being understood as property, but 
instead a shift to a particular type of property, a form of transferable IP similar to copyrights and patents.  
The right of publicity has been analogized primarily to copyrights and patents, and not to trademarks.  
This may be surprising given that trademark and unfair competition laws sometimes protect those with 
commercially-valuable identities from having their images and names used without permission, just as 
right of publicity laws can do.  Nevertheless, it is the broader and freely alienable patents and copyrights 
to which the right of publicity has been compared.  In contrast, trademarks have more limited alienability.  
They cannot be transferred in gross; transfers are limited to those that include transfers of the underlying 
goodwill of the business or of the particular product for which the mark is a source-identifier.  Notably, 
the status of trademark laws in the IP rubric is itself something that has been contested.  See S. Rep. No. 
79-1333, at 3–4 (1946) as reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1276 (contrasting trademarks with 
copyrights and patents); Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion:  Standing at the Crossroads of 
Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 105 passim (2005) (discussing the debate about whether trademark 
laws are better situated as IP rights, or as unfair competition claims); Mark A. Lemley, The Modern 
Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687 (1999) (describing the troubling shift 
over time in how we understand trademark law). 
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recordings) that, while technically not secret, was not meant for public use and 
distribution.  
The revisiting of the right of publicity’s origin story also provides a useful 
reminder of the value of questioning long-understood assertions about the law that 
have been repeated, but never supported.  Sometimes such repetition in law review 
articles and elsewhere has little impact, but, in this case, the mistaken notions of the 
right of publicity’s development have sent the right far off course.   
I will first consider the case often wrongly credited with creating the right of 
publicity―Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum―and then reveal the right 
of publicity’s true origins, explaining when the actual turn to becoming an 
independent IP right took place.  I will conclude with some challenges posed by this 
IP turn, as well as some implications that flow from this resurrected story of the right 
of publicity’s development. 
Almost twenty-five years ago, in 1995, Columbia Law School organized another 
Symposium on the right of publicity.9  Many of the concerns raised then and the 
disagreements voiced at that time remain today.  But none of the speakers at the time 
accurately understood the history of the right of publicity’s development.  As a result, 
the conversation stood on a shaky foundation—one that has long skewed our 
understanding of the right of publicity, its objectives, and the controversies that 
surround it.  Let us begin today’s Symposium by setting the record straight. 
I. A RIGHT IS NOT BORN:  HAELAN LABORATORIES V. TOPPS 
CHEWING GUM 
If the right of publicity is already familiar to you, you probably have long thought 
that the right was born in 1953 in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision in 
Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum.10  The case is commonly understood 
to be about protecting the interests of baseball players―even though no players were 
ever party to the case.  The case instead involved a dispute between two corporations 
that sold gum and candy with baseball trading cards, and revolved around the 
companies’ alleged interference with each others’ contracts.  Nevertheless, it is often 
claimed that the court in Haelan coined the term “right of publicity,” and created 
something new―a claim for public figures to stop (and collect damages for) 
unauthorized uses of their identities.  Peter Felcher and Edward Rubin described 
Haelan as creating a right of publicity “to protect the ability of baseball players to 
profit from the use of their photographs on bubble gum cards.”11  Sheldon Halpern 
explained Haelan as giving a “celebrity” the right to collect “damages” for 
 
 9. Symposium, Identity Crisis: A Vision for the Right of Publicity in the Year 2020, 20 COLUM.–
VLA J.L. & ARTS 1 (1995); see also J. Thomas McCarthy, The Spring 1995 Horace S. Manges 
Lecture―The Human Person as Commercial Property:  The Right of Publicity, 19 COLUM.–VLA J.L. & 
ARTS 129 (1995). 
 10. Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). 
 11. Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, The Descendibility of the Right of Publicity:  Is There 
Commercial Life after Death?, 89 YALE L.J. 1125, 1125 (1980).  
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unauthorized uses of his identity that had previously not existed.12  Stacey Dogan 
and Mark Lemley described Haelan as creating a “new cause of action” that 
“vindicat[ed]” the interests of “[c]elebrities frustrated with the right of privacy.”13  
Mark Bartholomew similarly presented the view that Haelan “called into being a 
new right” to address the unmet “economic” interests of celebrities, as opposed to 
their “dignitary concerns,” which he claims were the focus of privacy laws.14  This 
well-accepted, almost universal story of Haelan as coining and creating a “new” 
“right of publicity” turns out to be wrong. 
These and many other accomplished scholars (and virtually every author and 
court) writing on the topic since the decision issued have repeated the erroneous 
claim that because public figures voluntarily entered the limelight, sought out 
publicity, and suffered no personal injury from uses of their identities, they could not 
bring a privacy-based claim.  Instead, their injury was solely an economic one 
derived from lost endorsement deals.  Accordingly, the story goes, the Second Circuit 
needed to create a new right in Haelan to protect the baseball players from having 
their names and likenesses used without their permission on trading cards that were 
included with the gum and candy sold by the litigants in the case.  As it turns out, no 
part of this story of either Haelan or the law leading up to it is accurate―with the 
exception of the fact that the baseball trading cards were sold with the gum and 
candy.  
It is not a surprise that this mistaken reading and understanding of Haelan has 
persisted for so long.  If you relied only on the Second Circuit opinion, it would be 
easy to go astray in interpreting the decision, especially if you were not familiar with 
the relevant state laws at the time.  Haelan was misunderstood early on, both by law 
students, and by a prominent sports journalist writing about the decision shortly after 
it issued.15  Perhaps the first law school graduate to claim in writing that Haelan 
created something new was Melville Nimmer in his influential 1954 article, The 
Right of Publicity.  Of particular note, Nimmer  claimed that the decision in Haelan 
 
 12. Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity:  Commercial Exploitation of the Associative Value 
of Personality, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1199, 1201–02 (1986). 
 13. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from Trademark 
Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1172–73 (2006). 
 14. Mark Bartholomew, A Right is Born:  Celebrity, Property, and Postmodern Lawmaking, 44 
CONN. L. REV. 301, 310–11 (2011).  See also JESSICA LAKE, THE FACE THAT LAUNCHED A THOUSAND 
LAWSUITS:  THE AMERICAN WOMEN WHO FORGED A RIGHT TO PRIVACY 155, 179–81 (2016) (describing 
Haelan as “coin[ing]” the term and concept of the right of publicity and as “finally accord[ing] women 
and men quasi-property rights in their images.”  For additional examples, see ROTHMAN, supra, note 1, at 
199–200 n.1, and infra notes 15–17. 
 15. See, e.g., Joseph R. Grodin, Note, The Right of Publicity:  A Doctrinal Innovation, 62 YALE 
L.J. 1123, 1123–27 (1953); Case Comment, Right of Privacy―Nature and Extent―Baseball Players’ 
Rights to Prevent Commercial Use of Photographs Held Transferred to Promisee by Contract for 
Exclusive Advertising Use, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1536, 1536–37 (1953) (describing the case as having “for 
the first time termed” a “right of publicity” that “protects the advertising value of a person’s name or 
photograph”); John Randolph Ingram, Comment, Privacy―Unauthorized Use of 
Photographs―Infringement of Personal and Property Rights, 32 N.C. L. REV. 125 (1953); Donald A. 
Macksey, Comment, Torts―A Person has the Right to the Publicity Value of His Photograph, 
Independent of His Right of Privacy, Which May be Transferred in Gross, 41 GEO. L.J. 583 (1953); Red 
Smith, The Battle of Bubble Gum, N.Y. HERALD, Mar. 30, 1953, at 14.  
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was the first to “expressly recognize[] a ‘right of publicity.’”16  After this, courts and 
scholars repeated these erroneous assessments of Haelan without further 
investigation.17  There were few incentives for them to challenge this accepted view, 
as it was often of tangential import to a particular decision or a point an article was 
making.  As time went on and the citations amassed, there was even less reason to 
question the longstanding—although incorrect—assessments of Haelan.  
When one digs into the record and examines the facts behind Haelan, as I have 
done, it reveals a very different story both about the case, and about the right of 
publicity’s emergence in general.  Haelan was a contract case, not a privacy or 
publicity case.  To the extent we understand the case as being about the right of 
publicity, such a reading of the case undermines, rather than supports, the interests 
of the baseball players who, under the conventional description of the case, were the 
basis for the alleged creation of this “new” right.  The baseball players were not 
parties to the litigation, nor were their interests represented by either of the litigants.  
The creation of some new, transferable right of publicity would have served the 
plaintiff Haelan’s interests, but would have done so at the expense of the ballplayers 
who had given permission to both Haelan and the defendant Topps to use their 
identities on the trading cards.18  
Haelan involved a dispute between these two corporations that both sold gum and 
candy with baseball trading cards.  The cards were included to encourage sales of the 
primary products.  The dispute centered on thousands of contracts that gave both 
companies permission to use particular baseball players’ names, likenesses, and 
biographies on the trading cards.  The companies were locked in a competitive 
market and by the time of the litigation were the two major operators left in the 
baseball card business.  The plaintiff (initially Bowman Gum, later bought by 
 
 16. Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 204, 218–23 
(1954).  For more about this article and its motivations, see infra notes 93–103 & accompanying text. 
 17. See, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 929 (6th Cir. 2003) (pointing to Haelan 
as having “coined the phrase ‘right of publicity,’” and having invented a new “cause of action”); Fleer 
Corp. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 658 F.2d 139, 148 (3d Cir. 1982) (describing Haelan as “establish[ing] a 
new ‘right of publicity’”); JANE M. GAINES, CONTESTED CULTURE:  THE IMAGE, THE VOICE, AND THE 
LAW 187–89 (1991) (describing Haelan as creating a “brand-new right”); Eric E. Johnson, Disentangling 
the Right of Publicity, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 891, 892 (2017) (claiming that the “right of publicity first sprang 
up some sixty years ago” in the Haelan decision); Arlen W. Langvardt, The Troubling Implications of a 
Right of Publicity ‘Wheel Spun out of Control, 45 KAN. L. REV. 329, 334 (1997) (crediting Haelan with 
both “coin[ing]” the term and creating the “first formal recognition of a right of publicity cause of action”); 
see also supra notes 11–16.  One of the few exceptions is Stuart Banner, who in his book about the history 
of American property law notes that celebrities’ rights to their names and likenesses had been protected 
long before Haelan.  He still incorrectly concluded that the term “right of publicity” was coined by the 
court in Haelan, but comes closer than others in acknowledging the breadth of misappropriation claims 
that predated that decision.  STUART BANNER, AMERICAN PROPERTY:  A HISTORY OF HOW, WHY, AND 
WHAT WE OWN 154 (2011).  The leading treatise author on the right of publicity also expresses conflicting 
views on the subject of Haelan―at first noting that the court “invent[ed] a new legal label,” created the 
concept, and coined the term, while also noting in a footnote that the term was not novel at the time of the 
decision.  J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 1 THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, § 1:26, 52–55 n.1 (2016). 
 18. ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 50–64. 
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Haelan) wanted to beat Topps in the market by getting players to sign exclusive 
contracts with it.19 
The conventional account of Haelan derives in part from a retrospective and false 
narrative about the failings of the right of privacy.  In contrast to this widely-accepted 
view, the right of privacy had long recognized the rights of public figures—like the 
well-known baseball players in Haelan—to control uses of their identities.  There 
was no question either before or after Haelan that the companies needed the baseball 
players’ permission to use their identities on things like trading cards.  Under 
applicable New York privacy law, both companies needed to get the players’ written 
permission to do so, and it was expected that they would pay for the privilege, which 
both companies in the case did.20  
The dispute in Haelan was not about whether the players had a right to control 
uses of their identities in a commercial context, something they already had.  Instead, 
the dispute centered on a very different question:  Whether one company, Haelan, 
could prevent its competitor, Topps, from using the same players on its cards if 
Haelan had a prior signed contract with those players granting it the exclusive rights 
to do so.  Haelan did not need a new legal entitlement to enforce such exclusive 
contract rights.  There were a number of claims at its disposal.  It could have sued 
the players directly for breach of contract.  Existing contract and tort law also 
provided Haelan the ability to enforce exclusive contracts against competitors like 
Topps.21  
Surprisingly, given Haelan’s status in right of publicity folklore, neither the 
original nor amended complaints filed in the case included a privacy-based claim, a 
right of publicity claim, or anything remotely similar to one.  The primary 
claim―and the only claim appealed to the Second Circuit―was an interference with 
contract claim.  Bowman (Haelan’s predecessor) claimed that Topps had knowingly 
induced players to breach the exclusivity provisions of their agreements with 
Bowman.  The amended complaint also included claims for trade dress and 
 
 19. Id. at 45–46, 50–64, & 201–02 nn.8–9; see also Testimony of Jack Griffith Rensel, Transcript 
of Record at 212–19, Haelan Labs. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866 (No. 22564) [hereinafter Haelan 
TR] (on file with author) (noting awareness that players had some contracts with other companies, and 
explaining that players were told they “must list in what we called the exception clause any contracts that 
they might have prior to this time that might be in conflict because . . . you are not supposed to or not 
allowed to sign with two people for any given product”); Testimony of Joseph J. Donahue, Haelan TR at 
84–118; DEAN HANLEY BUBBLE GUM CARD WAR:  THE GREAT BOWMAN & TOPPS SETS FROM 1948 TO 
1955 (2016); DAVE JAMIESON, MINT CONDITION:  HOW BASEBALL CARDS BECAME AN AMERICAN 
OBSESSION 16–29, 49–67, 89–113 (2010); J. Gordon Hylton, Baseball Cards and the Birth of the Right 
of Publicity:  The Curious Case of Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. 
REV. 273, 275–83 (2001); see also Affidavit of Joseph J. Donahue, Apr. 25, 1955, at 4, in Haelan Labs. v. 
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., No. 04430 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955) (“[D]efendant Topps commenced a campaign 
to destroy plaintiff’s business by using the names and pictures of players under exclusive contracts to 
plaintiff.”) (on file with Kings County Clerk, Supreme Court Records).  Haelan Labs. became the 
substituted plaintiff on appeal to the Second Circuit after it purchased Bowman Gum.  Bowman Gum v. 
Topps Chewing Gum, 103 F. Supp. 944 (E.D.N.Y. 1952), rev’d sub nom. Haelan Labs. v. Topps Chewing 
Gum, 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).  
 20. ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 61–64, 203 n.27; see also Jansen v. Hilo Packing Co., Inc., 118 
N.Y.S.2d 162 (Sup. Ct. 1952).  
 21. ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 50–64. 
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trademark infringement for the use of allegedly similar trade names and packaging 
designs.  These claims were dismissed by the district court, and were not appealed to 
the Second Circuit.22 
The remaining impairment of contract claim that was the sole focus of the Second 
Circuit appeal was challenging both because of the sheer number of contracts at issue 
and because it was not clear that Topps had knowledge of the prior conflicting 
contracts with Bowman, at least not in every instance.  This, however, should not 
have been a fatal stumbling block, as exclusive contracts could still be enforced 
against third-parties regardless of their knowledge of their existence, as the district 
court noted was true in the context of personal services contracts, and as the judge 
initially thought was true in this instance.23 
Another potential complication in the case stemmed from the possibility that some 
of the contracts were invalid, formed on the basis of misrepresentations, questionable 
extensions, and sometimes without payment of the agreed-upon compensation.  In 
part to avoid wading into each individual contract and the circumstances surrounding 
its signing, Topps’s lead counsel, George Middleton, led us down the path toward a 
right of publicity―although his goals and those of his client were not served by such 
a concept.  Middleton claimed that the contracts constituted waivers of the players’ 
rights of privacy―an agreement to not sue Bowman, rather than a grant of any 
affirmative right to Bowman.  Therefore, according to Topps, the contracts did not 
convey anything of value to Bowman that could be enforced against a third-
party―even if the waiver were designated an exclusive one.24  
Middleton cited a line of cases that had rejected the transferability of privacy 
rights to support his conclusion.  He suggested that the only way that Bowman could 
enforce its rights was if the players granted to it an intellectual property-like right 
akin to an exclusive license in a copyrighted work or a patented invention.  Middleton 
claimed such transferability would so greatly limit the players’ freedom as to be 
analogous to enslaving them:  “Baseball players are not [Bowman’s] bond slaves, 
though it seems to think so.”25  Middleton contended that because the players had 
given permission to both companies to use their identities, both companies should be 
able to do so.26 
Initially, the trial judge rejected Topps’s argument, concluding that an impairment 
of contract claim could stand, and that injunctive relief was appropriate to enforce 
 
 22. See Haelan Labs, 202 F.2d at 868; Bowman Gum, 103 F. Supp. at 947–48; Amended 
Complaint, Bowman Gum v. Topps Chewing Gum, Haelan TR at 5–23; Complaint, Bowman Gum v. 
Topps Chewing Gum, 103 F. Supp. 944 (E.D.N.Y. 1952); see also ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 51, 53–54. 
 23. Trial Transcript, Haelan TR at 48–50, 77–80, 194–95. 
 24. ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 53–54, 57–63, 202 nn.13–17; see also Haelan Labs, 202 F.2d at 
868; Memorandum by Judge Charles Edward Clark (January 19, 1953) (on file with Yale Univ. Library) 
1–2.  
 25. Brief of Defendant at 64, Bowman Gum, 103 F. Supp. 944 (E.D.N.Y. 1952); Reply Brief for 
Defendant at 6, 11, Bowman Gum, 103 F. Supp. 944 (E.D.N.Y. 1952). 
 26. ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 57–58 & 202 nn. 17–19; see also id. at 37–38, 46–50 (challenging 
Topps’s interpretation of line of cases upon which it relied, particularly Gautier v. Pro-Football, 107 
N.E.2d 485 (N.Y. 1952), Pakas Co. v. Leslie (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 19, 1915), and Hanna Mfg. v. Hillerich 
& Bradsby Co., 78 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1935)). 
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superior and exclusive contracts.  But Middleton was insistent on his reading of the 
law, and eventually persuaded the district court judge to reconsider.  The judge 
ultimately issued an opinion agreeing with Topps that Bowman could only sue third 
parties to enforce its contractual rights if the contract transferred the players’ rights 
to their own names and likenesses to Bowman, or at least transferred the right to sue 
for violations of the players’ privacy rights.27 
Bowman Gum appealed.  During the appeal, Haelan purchased Bowman Gum 
and became the named plaintiff.  Haelan’s appellate briefs contended that the players’ 
contracts with Bowman were enforceable without regard to whether the players’ 
rights to their own names and likenesses had been transferred to it.  Haelan accurately 
noted that the players’ names and likenesses were “commercially and pecuniarily 
valuable,” and therefore the contracts had value that could be enforced.  Haelan did 
not think transferability was a relevant consideration, but noted that if its success in 
the lawsuit turned on that question, then the contracts should be interpreted as 
transferring such rights to it.28 
On February 16, 1953, the Second Circuit issued its oft-quoted and frequently 
misinterpreted majority opinion.  The short opinion authored by Judge Jerome Frank, 
and signed on to by Judge Charles Edward Clark, remanded the case to the district 
court with instructions to further develop the facts, particularly the specific terms and 
legitimacy of each contract, as well as what each company knew.  The court 
concluded that if Topps, “knowing of the contract, deliberately induced the ball-
player to break that promise, [then] defendant behaved tortiously.”29  Judge Thomas 
Walter Swan, in his concurrence, agreed with this conclusion, and thought the 
opinion should end there―it was an impairment of contract case.30 
Frank’s opinion, however, did not stop there, leading to confusion that lasts to this 
day.  He suggested, as had Haelan in its briefs, that if Topps’s reading of the right of 
privacy turned out to be correct (and prevented a claim here), then “in addition to 
and independent of that right of privacy . . . a man has a right in the publicity value 
of his photograph.”31  Frank dubbed this a “right of publicity” without realizing either 
that term’s longstanding use and history, or the scope of New York’s right of privacy 
statute which already covered the publicity value of public figures’ 
photographs―something it had done for decades before Frank considered the 
issue.32  Frank suggested that this “right to grant the exclusive privilege of 
publishing” a person’s likeness could be assigned “in gross” without any related 
 
 27. Bowman Gum, 103 F. Supp. at 948–54. 
 28. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 2, 15–32, Haelan Labs v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866 
(2d Cir. 1953); Reply Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 3–18, Haelan Labs. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 
F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).  See also ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 58–59. 
 29. Haelan Labs, 202 F.2d at 866, 867–69. 
 30. Id. at 869 (Swan, C. J., concurring in part); see also Memorandum by Judge Thomas Walter 
Swan (Jan. 16, 1953) (on file with Yale Univ. Library). 
 31. Haelan Labs., 202 F.2d at 868. 
 32. Id.; Jansen v. Hilo Packing Co., Inc., 118 N.Y.S.2d 162 (Sup. Ct. 1952), aff’d, 125 N.Y.S.2d 
648 (N.Y. App. Div. 1953) (providing a privacy-based claim to baseball players whose images had been 
used on popcorn containers and packages of gum without permission); see also ROTHMAN, supra note 1, 
at 61–64, 203 n.27. 
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transfer of an underlying business, and without any ongoing connection to the 
individual players (something required in the context of the assignment of a 
trademark).33 
This conditional discussion in the opinion of a right of publicity was contingent 
on a possible failure in privacy law, one hypothesized on the basis of an apparent 
lack of familiarity with New York state law.  Judge Frank’s and Judge Clark’s files 
in the case, as well as the opinion itself, reveal that both judges were uncertain about 
whether New York’s longstanding privacy law protected the ballplayers’ right to 
collect endorsement fees―despite the reality that players had been collecting such 
fees for decades, including in the very case before them.34 
If the Second Circuit thought it had created a new right―which is not entirely 
clear―such a right was one it had no power to invent.  As a federal court, it had no 
authority to change state law.  Unsurprisingly then, the parties to Haelan treated the 
case as a contract case on remand, rather than as one about privacy or publicity rights.  
The district court judge interpreted the guidance from the appellate court as about 
contract law, and upon the case’s return instructed a magistrate judge to start wading 
through all of the contracts.  The case ultimately settled without a final judgment 
when Topps bought out Haelan’s successor, Connelly Containers.35  
Most importantly, the state courts in New York, that have the final word on such 
questions of state law, rejected the conventional (yet incorrect) reading of Haelan as 
creating a new right.  So, to the extent that the Second Circuit even intended to create 
 
 33. Haelan Labs., 202 F.2d at 868. 
 34. Judge Clark likely misread New York law on this question because of his acceptance of the 
claims in a book review written by Herman Finkelstein.  Clark likely saw Finkelstein’s review because it 
coincidentally followed his own review of a new civil procedure casebook in the Yale Law Journal.  
Finkelstein reviewed Samuel Spring’s book, RISK AND RIGHTS IN PUBLISHING, TELEVISION, RADIO, 
MOTION PICTURES, ADVERTISING, AND THE THEATER (1952).  Spring’s book documented the 
longstanding protection provided by New York’s privacy statute of the names and likenesses of public 
performers and models.  Finkelstein disagreed with Spring’s assessment of New York law.  Judge Clark 
relied on Finkelstein’s assessment of the law, rather than Spring’s book or the underlying decisions.  
Memorandum of Judge Charles Edward Clark to Judge Jerome N. Frank (Feb. 6, 1953) (on file with Yale 
Univ. Library); Herman Finkelstein, Risks and Rights in Publishing, Television, Radio, Motion Pictures, 
Advertising, and the Theater, 62 YALE L.J. 298, 300 (1953) (book review); Charles E. Clark, Cases and 
Materials on Modern Procedure and Judicial Administration, 62 YALE L.J. 292 (1953) (reviewing 
casebook by Arthur T. Vanderbilt).  Interestingly, Judge Frank, who wrote the opinion in Haelan, declined 
to cite to Finkelstein’s book review because he thought it suggested that New York law would not 
countenance the claim they suggested existed.  Memorandum of Judge Frank to Judge Clark (Feb. 7, 1953) 
(on file with Yale Univ. Library); see also ROTHMAN, supra 1, 60–61, 203 nn. 24–28. 
 35. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 18–19, 21–24, Topps Chewing Gum v. Haelan Labs., 346 U.S. 
816 (1953) (No. 82286); Respondent’s Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, 8–15, 
Topps Chewing Gum, 346 U.S. 816 (No. 82286); Transcript of Record, June 13, 1955, Haelan Labs. v. 
Topps Chewing Gum, 131 F. Supp. 262 (E.D.N.Y. 1955) (No. 11852); Memorandum of Judge Galston, 
Haelan Labs., 131 F. Supp. 262 (E.D.N.Y. 1955) (No. 11852) (Feb. 9, 1955); Supplemental Complaint, 
Haelan Labs., 112 F. Supp. 904 (E.D.N.Y. 1953) (No. 11852) (May 17, 1954); Answer to Supplemental 
Complaint, Haelan Labs., 112 F. Supp. 904 (E.D.N.Y. 1953) (No. 11852) (June 22, 1954); Complaint, 
Haelan Labs. v. Topps Chewing Gum (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 26, 1955) (No. 04430); see also ROTHMAN, 
supra note 1, at 61–63, 203–04 nn.27–28, nn.30–33; JAMIESON, supra note 19, at 100–01; Hylton, supra 
note 19, at 291. 
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a new right under state law, the decision has been expressly overruled.36  Despite this 
reality, the dominant, but mistaken, reading of Haelan has created problems going 
forward, and shored up a skewed understanding of both today’s right of publicity and 
today’s privacy laws.  
II. THE ORIGINAL RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
The decision in Haelan and subsequent commentary about the decision fomented 
the common misunderstanding of the right of publicity as the “reverse side of the 
coin” of privacy law and the simplistic and historically inaccurate view that privacy 
laws protect seclusion, secrecy, and hurt feelings while publicity laws primarily 
(sometimes exclusively) protect celebrities and their economic interests.37  This 
division was not true at the time of the right of privacy’s emergence in the United 
States, nor was it true for many decades after Haelan was decided, and it remains 
untrue even today in many jurisdictions.38 
The right of privacy was the original “right of publicity.”  The terms were used 
interchangeably starting in the mid to late 1800s.  While today the right of privacy 
means many different types of privacy, including information and data privacy, and 
constitutional issues of decisional and spatial privacy, at its origin in the mid to late 
1800s, privacy was expressly located in tort law, and primarily focused on providing 
a way to control the use of one’s name and likeness.  This is the very same interest 
protected by today’s right of publicity laws.39 
The initial adoption of a right to privacy was driven by efforts to create a claim 
that would allow individuals to control “publicity” about themselves—when and how 
their image and name could be used by others in public.  The term right of publicity 
was used at that time, and the right of privacy was frequently referred to as a right to 
stop “unwarranted publicity” about oneself.40  In 1911, an article in the Columbia 
Law Review defined the right of “privacy” as the “Right to Immunity from Wrongful 
Publicity.”41  In 1927, the Kentucky Court of Appeals described the right of privacy 
as the “right to be free from unwarranted publicity.”42  In 1929, George Ragland Jr. 
wrote in the Kentucky Law Journal that the “typical” right of privacy cases were the 
 
 36. Stephano v. News Grp. Publ’ns, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 583–85 (N.Y. 1984) (rejecting the 
existence of a common law right of publicity independent from the statutory right of privacy provided by 
N.Y. Civil Rights Law §§ 50 & 51); see also ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 61–64, 203–04 nn.30–34.  
 37. Nimmer, supra note 16, at 204; see also ROTHMAN, supra note 1 passim; supra note 4. 
 38. ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 11–44. 
 39. Id. at 11–29. 
 40. See, e.g., Brents v. Morgan, 299 S.W. 967, 970 (Ky. 1927); Marks v. Jaffa, 26 N.Y.S. 908, 909–
10 (Sup. Ct. 1893); “Privacy,” 41 AM. JUR. § 2, at 925 (1942); 21 RULING CASE LAW 1196–98 (William 
M. McKinney & Burdett A. Rich eds., 1918); E.L. Godkin, The Rights of the Citizen:  To His Own 
Reputation, SCRIBNER’S MAG., July 1890, at 58, 65; Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right 
to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 196 (1890); George B. Corkhill, Editorial, Portrait Right, 12 WASH. L. 
REP.  353 (1884); The Right of Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1902, at 8; see also infra notes 41–51. 
 41. Note, The Right to Immunity from Wrongful Publicity, 11 COLUM. L. REV. 566, 566–68 (1911). 
 42. Brents, 299 S.W. at 969–70.  At the time Brents was decided, the Kentucky Court of Appeals 
was the highest court in Kentucky.  The state now has a Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals has 
become the intermediate appellate court in the state. 
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“picture-ad” cases.43  A few years later, in 1932, Leon Green similarly noted that the 
more frequent privacy claims were about the “appropriation of [] personality,” 
including the use of a person’s name or likeness.44  The American Law Institute’s 
first Restatement of Torts, published in 1939, described the privacy tort as providing 
a claim when a “person unreasonably and seriously interferes with another’s interest 
in not having his affairs known to others or his likeness exhibited to the public.”45  
In his influential 1941 torts treatise, William Prosser described the right of privacy 
as providing a right to control “publicity given to [a person’s] name or likeness, . . . 
and the commercial appropriation of elements of his personality.”  He noted that the 
largest “number of privacy cases . . . involved the appropriation of some element of 
the plaintiff’s personality for a commercial use.  The typical case is that of the 
unauthorized use of his picture in the defendant’s advertising.”46  This “exploitation 
of another’s personality for commercial purposes” was at the heart of the right of 
privacy, and courts recognized this right as primarily focused on providing a right to 
stop “unauthorized and unwarranted publicity.”47  This decades-long understanding 
of the right of privacy as being a right to control “publicity” about oneself―including 
the right to stop unauthorized uses of one’s name and likeness―was central to the 
adoption of the right of privacy, and long predated the decision in Haelan. 
The very first cases to consider whether there was a right of privacy in the United 
States were ones that involved situations that today would be considered typical right 
of publicity cases.  Many of the first privacy cases involved the use of people’s 
likenesses on products and in advertisements.  It was these early cases, rather than 
cases about intrusion into secluded spaces or the publication of private facts, that 
played a dominant role in the creation of a right of privacy. 
 
 43. George Ragland, Jr., The Right of Privacy, 17 KY. L.J. 85, 115 (1929) (citation omitted). 
 44. Leon Green, The Right of Privacy, 27 ILL. L. REV. 237, 239 (1932). 
 45. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 867 (1939). 
 46. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 107, at 1050, 1056 (1941). 
 47. Fairfield v. Am. Photocopy Equip. Co., 291 P.2d 194, 197 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955). 
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 Some of you may already be familiar with the early 1900s cases Roberson v. 
Rochester Folding Box Co. and Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance.  (The 
infringing images from each case are provided below in Figures 1 and 2.)  In 
Roberson, a photograph of a young woman, Abigail Roberson, was used without her 
permission in an advertisement for flour: 
 
Figure 1.  Advertisement for Franklin Mills Flour with photograph of Abigail Roberson, published in 
The Right of Privacy, 12 PROFITABLE ADVERTISING 187 (1902). 
 
Roberson had voluntarily sat for the photograph that was used.  She had not, 
however, authorized the photographer to license its use in any context and certainly 
not in advertisements for Franklin Mills Flour.  Yet, the highest court in New York, 
the New York Court of Appeals, rejected Roberson’s claim, concluding that there 
was no right of privacy under the state’s common law that would provide her with 
relief.  The judges in the majority were sympathetic to her plight, but thought that 
the legislature was the appropriate body to craft a remedy.48  Outrage followed in the 
wake of the Roberson decision, leading to the swift passage in 1903 of one of the 
nation’s first privacy statutes.49  The statute made it a civil injury and a misdemeanor 
 
 48. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902), superseded by statute, N.Y. 
Civ. Rights Law §§ 50 & 51 (McKinney 2019).  For further discussion of this case and its aftermath see 
ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 21–25. 
 49. See, e.g., The Right of Privacy, supra note 40, at 8 (newspaper article describing Roberson as a 
decision that caused “amazement among lawyers and jurists,” and that should be abrogated by the 
legislature); Case Comment, Right to Privacy:  Injunction Denied a Young Woman to Restrain the 
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to use “for advertising purposes, or for the purposes of trade, the name, portrait or 
picture of any living person” without written consent.50  
The second example of an early privacy case that may be familiar to you is 
Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance. The plaintiff, Paolo Pavesich, sued when 
his image was used without his permission in an advertisement for life insurance: 
Figure 2.  Paolo Pavesich appears in the photograph on the left.  The advertisement appeared in the 
ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, Nov. 15, 1903, at 9. 
 
Like Roberson, Pavesich had voluntarily sat for a photograph which was then used 
without his permission in the advertisement.  Pavesich’s lawsuit led Georgia to 
become the first state to have its highest court―here the Supreme Court of Georgia― 
recognize a right of privacy under the state’s common law.51 
 
Publication of her Portrait on Commercial Packages for the Purpose of Advertising, 36 AM. L. REV. 614–
20, 634–36 (1902) (describing the decision as one that “shocks and wounds the ordinary sense of justice”) 
(due to an apparent printing error the commentary on Roberson is discontinuous); see also ROTHMAN, 
supra note 1, at 24–25; Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 78–81 (Ga. 1905) (comparing 
the decision in Roberson to Lord Hale’s decision in the 1600s “imposing the death penalty for witchcraft 
upon ignorant and harmless women”).  
 50. Act of Apr. 6, 1903, ch. 132, 1903 N.Y. Laws 308 (codified as amended at N.Y. Civil Rights 
Law §§ 50–51, 1909 N.Y. Laws 317).  The statute was later expanded in 1995 to include civil liability for 
uses of a person’s voice.  Act of Aug. 9, 1995, Ch. 674, 1995 N.Y. Laws 3642 (codified at N.Y. Civ. 
Rights Law § 51).  Shortly after New York passed its first privacy law, Virginia adopted a similar statute. 
Act of Mar. 7, 1904, ch. 66, 1904 Va. Acts 111 (codified at Va. Code Ann. § 2897a; 10 Va. L. Reg. 824 
(Jan. 1905)).  In 1919, Virginia added a postmortem provision to the section and renumbered the section 
as § 5782. Va. Code Ann. § 5782 (1919). 
 51. The court in Pavesich used the term “right of publicity” in its decision, but likely meant 
something different from what commentators meant at the time by the right to stop “unwarranted 
publicity,” and from what we mean by the term today.  The court concluded that: 
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Many have focused on these cases as being emblematic of claims brought by 
private figures.  But Roberson and Pavesich were part of a larger conversation at the 
time about controlling publicity about oneself―a conversation that included and 
even featured prominent public figures and celebrities.  Concerns over the use of 
one’s image and name reached a fever pitch in the mid-to late 1800s because of a 
number of changes in technology arising from the industrial revolution.  These 
changes led to the development of a national and international culture, a rise in 
recognized celebrities with endorsement careers, and improved printing technology 
that led to a proliferation of newspapers and magazines (and the use of photographs 
in them).  The improved printing technology created ruthless competition among 
newspapers and magazines that gave rise to the era of so-called yellow 
journalism―which, along with the other shifts, further supported calls for a right to 
privacy.  These changes also led to a shift in the style of advertising from an 
informative model to a persuasive one.  This new advertising mode more frequently 
relied on using photographs and drawings of real people, as well as their names.52 
One of the major technological breakthroughs of this era also drove the move 
toward a right of privacy.  Portable cameras developed that could be used by 
amateurs on the streets to document people’s public activities, and then share them 
without permission, much like friends and strangers often do on social media 
platforms today.  These cameras were tellingly described as “detective cameras.”53  
Ads at the time from Kodak and other manufacturers highlighted the ability to take 
images of unwitting subjects.  The Folmer & Schwing Manufacturing Company 
advertised its Deceptive Angle Camera with a drawing of a man pointing his camera 
in front of him, while secretly taking a picture of two women sitting on a rock behind 
him (wearing what appear to be bathing costumes of the era).54 
Many of the calls for creating a right of privacy at this time were focused on 
addressing concerns over the taking of these photographs, and their use in and on 
products, in advertisements, as well as in films and newspapers.  Numerous articles 
and essays starting in the mid-1800s called for a right to control images of oneself, 
 
The right of one to exhibit himself to the public at all proper times, in all proper places, and in a 
proper manner is embraced within the right of personal liberty.  The right to withdraw from the 
public gaze at such times as a person may see fit, when his presence in public is not demanded by 
any rule of law, is also embraced within the right of personal liberty.  Publicity in one instance, 
and privacy in the other are each guarantied.  If personal liberty embraces the right of publicity, it 
no less embraces the correlative right of privacy, and this is no new idea in Georgia law. 
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 70 (Ga. 1905) (emphasis added).  The court used the 
term “right of publicity” likely to refer to an aspect of the right of liberty, and particularly the right to 
appear in public.  The court then suggested an associated liberty-based right to not be forced to appear in 
public against one’s wishes (such as in an advertisement).  Regardless of how the Pavesich court used the 
term, courts and scholars of the era called for a right to control “publicity” about oneself in the exact same 
sense we use the term today and as an aspect of privacy, or simply as a definition of privacy itself.  See 
ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 27–29; see also supra notes 40–48, and infra notes 56–70, and accompanying 
text. 
 52. ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 12–15, 188–89 nn.2–8. 
 53. Id. at 12–15, 188 nn.2–5; The Right of Privacy, supra note 40, at 8; Proceedings of Societies, 
PHOTOGRAPHIC NEWS, Nov. 9, 1888, at 717, 719. 
 54. ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 12–15; Advert. for Folmer & Schwing Deceptive Angle Camera 
from 1904, in ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 14. 
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particularly photographs that were taken either with or without permission.55  In 
1869, the America Law Register published an article advocating for the creation of a 
cause of action to prevent the selling of a person’s photographic image without 
permission.  The author contended that people should be understood to have a 
“natural copyright” in their “own features” that would give them the right to bar 
others from using their image without permission.56  In 1884, an article in the 
Washington Law Reporter called for a “portrait right” to provide a right to control 
“publicity” about oneself, and particularly the use of photographs.57  The New York 
Times in 1902 called for a right of privacy, even one that would limit the newspaper’s 
own publication of images of the president and prominent business men.58  It is hard 
to imagine today that a newspaper like The New York Times would call for such a 
limit on itself.  
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s famous and influential 1890 Harvard Law 
Review article, The Right to Privacy, was one of many essays and articles on the topic 
written in the later part of the 19th Century.59  Their article was influential in the 
courts, but it was also part and parcel of a widespread discussion across society about 
these issues.  A few months before Warren and Brandeis’s article was published, 
Edwin Lawrence Godkin, a well-regarded journalist, wrote an essay that also was 
cited by courts in decisions of the era.60  In Scribner’s Magazine, Godkin highlighted 
the importance of privacy, and called for a right to control “publicity” about oneself.  
Despite being a journalist himself, he criticized newspapers for profiting from 
exploiting people’s private lives.  He thought the law should recognize a right to 
control “how much or how little publicity should surround [our] daily lives.”61  
Warren and Brandeis shared Godkin’s disdain for using gossip to sell papers and 
emphasized the growing concern about “unauthorized circulation of portraits of 
private persons.”62  They described the “simplest case” for a right to privacy as the 
“right of one who has remained a private individual[] to prevent his public 
portraiture.”63  Warren and Brandeis called for an extension of Thomas Cooley’s 
concept of a “right to be let alone” to encompass a right to stop unwanted “publicity” 
about oneself that could cause “mental pain and distress” “far greater than could be 
inflicted by mere bodily injury.”64 
 
 55. Id. at 16–29. 
 56. John A. Jameson, The Legal Relations of Photographs, 17 AM. L. REG. 1, 8 (1869). 
 57. George B. Corkill, Editorial, Portrait Right, 12 WASH. L. REP. 353 (1884). 
 58. The Right of Privacy, supra note 40, at 8; see also ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 17–18, 190 n.11. 
 59. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 40, at 208–11; see also ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 13–20. 
 60. Godkin, supra note 40, at 58.  A number of early cases considering privacy claims cited to 
Godkin’s essay.  See, e.g., Schuyler v. Curtis, 15 N.Y.S. 787 (Sup. Ct. 1891), aff’d, 19 N.Y.S. 264 (Sup. 
Ct. 1892), rev’d 42 N.E. 22 (N.Y. 1895). 
 61. Godkin, supra note 40, at 65. 
 62. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 40, at 194–95. 
 63. Id. at 213–14. 
 64. Id. at 195–96.  Cooley’s influential treatise on tort law added a right of “personal immunity” or 
a right “to be let alone” in the second edition, published in 1888.  This right was added primarily to 
encompass protection against nonphysical injuries, such as assault (which allows liability on the basis of 
a perception of an unwanted physical contact, rather than on the completion of that contact, as required 
for battery).  Cooley’s addition of these rights was part of a larger move at the time to recognize emotional 
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Although Warren and Brandeis suggested that private figures should have greater 
control over their identities than public figures―who might need to be referred to 
for news reporting purposes―they advocated for a right of privacy that would 
encompass protection for prominent public figures.  Of particular note, they 
explicitly supported a lawsuit brought at the time by Marion Manola, a stage 
performer, who sued when the manager of the show she was appearing in took a 
picture of her without her permission.  Not only was she a public personality at the 
time, but the disputed image was taken during a public performance while she was 
on stage in front of an audience.  Manola claimed that she did not want the image of 
her wearing her costume (which included tights) circulated―something the manager 
threatened to do to increase attendance at the show.  A New York trial court issued 
an injunction barring the use of the photograph.  Manola’s claim was widely covered 
in newspapers across the country, with public opinion squarely in her favor.65  
Beginning in the 1880s, public and private figures alike advocated for legislation 
to address the unwanted use of portraits and photographs.  In 1888, legislation was 
introduced in Congress to “prohibit the use of likenesses, portraits, or representations 
of females for advertising purposes, without consent in writing.”66  The bill proposed 
protecting both the dead and the living, and penalties that included prison time and a 
criminal fine that could run as high as $5,000 (an amount equal to more than 
$125,000 in today’s dollars).  The legislation was driven by concern over the use of 
the likeness of one of the most famous and public women at the time, the First Lady, 
Mrs. Frances Folsom Cleveland, whose image often adorned advertisements and 
merchandise without her permission.67  In 1899, a women’s club in Illinois sought 
similar legislation to prevent a woman’s face from becoming “an advertiser’s 
fortune.”68  
Politicians on both coasts in the late 1800s sought to stop the use of their 
likenesses, particularly in political cartoons, despite their status as prominent public 
figures.  In 1897, New York Senator Timothy E. Ellsworth introduced a bill to 
“restrain the unauthorized printing, publishing, or circulating of portraits.”69  The 
New York bill failed in the state assembly, but, in 1899, California legislators 
succeeded in passing a similar bill.  The California bill, like the New York one, was 
 
as well as physical injuries.  Cooley advocated in the same edition of his treatise for recognition of 
reputational injuries and for the protection of private letters to prevent injuries to feelings from 
unauthorized publication of such letters.  THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR 
THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 29–33, 42–43 (Fred B. Rothman & Co., 2d ed. 
1888); see also ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 15–16; G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA:  AN 
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 4–5, 173–76 (3d ed. 2003). 
 65. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 40, 195–96 n.7; Will Not Be Photographed in Tights:  Miss 
Manola Will Wear Them, but There She Draws the Line, CHI. TRIBUNE, June 13, 1890, at 6; Manola Gets 
an Injunction, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1890, at 3; see also ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 20–21, 191 n.20. 
 66. A Bill to Protect Ladies, H.R. 8151, 50th Cong. (1888). 
 67. A Chivalrous Congressman, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 6, 1888, at 1; ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 17–
18, 190 nn.12–13. 
 68. A New Crusade, 8 PROFITABLE ADVERT. 561 (Mar. 15, 1899); Polly Larkin, MARIN J., Mar. 9, 
1899, at 1; ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 18, 190 n.14. 
 69. New York Legislature, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1897, at 4; Anti-Cartoon Bill Again, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 17, 1897, at 1. 
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dubbed the Anti-Cartoon bill, and prohibited the publication “in any newspaper, 
handbill, poster, book or serial publication . . . the portrait of any living person a 
resident of California.”  The final version of the bill as passed excluded those holding 
public office from this provision, but another part of the law gave even public office 
holders the right to stop caricatures of their likenesses if such uses “reflect upon the 
honor, integrity, manhood, virtue, reputation, or business or political motives of the 
person so caricatured, or which tend to expose the individual so caricatured to public 
hatred, ridicule, or contempt.”70 
The role privacy laws played in protecting against “unwarranted publicity” and 
unauthorized uses of one’s name and likeness is often forgotten, as is their 
applicability to public figures, and the ability to collect money damages for losses, 
including professional damages.  Yet, from the beginning, right of privacy laws did 
the same work that right of publicity laws do today. 
III. THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY DID PUBLICITY’S WORK 
The right of privacy protected public and private figures, including individuals 
with commercially-valuable identities who actively promoted their identities and 
sought out publicity.71  Public figures successfully brought privacy-based claims and 
recovered damages.  Lawsuits were brought by actors, athletes, and singers, such as 
suits filed by Marion Manola, Rudolph Marks, Felicite Skiff Riddle, Nancy Flake, 
Gladys Loftus, Jack Redmond, and Fred Astaire.72  Prominent scientists, doctors, 
politicians, and university presidents also brought successful claims and recovered 
damages, including suits brought by Thomas Edison, Sir Morell Mackenzie, J. P. 
Chinn, and Charles Eliot.73  Across the country, courts were clear that one’s “public 
character” did not constitute a waiver of the right of privacy or the right to control 
 
 70. Senators Get Even with Newspapers, S.F. CALL, Feb. 21, 1899, at 3; Act of Feb. 23, 1899, ch. 
29, 1899 Cal. Stat. 28 (codified at Cal. Penal Code § 258) (Deering 1915).  There is no evidence that the 
California law was ever enforced, and it was repealed in 1915.  Act of May 22, 1915, ch. 459, 1915 Cal. 
Stat. 761; Useless Anti-Cartoon Bill May Be Repealed, S.F. CALL, Jan. 21, 1901, at 4.  For further 
discussion of these legislative efforts in both California and New York, see ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 
18–19, 191 nn.16–17.  
 71. See ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 30–44, 193–98 nn.1–25.  The erroneous claim that public figures 
could not recover, or if they could, that they could not get money damages for professional injuries under 
privacy laws, was in part driven by Harold R. Gordon’s article, Right of Property in Name, Likeness, 
Personality and History, 55 NW. U. L. REV. 553 passim (1960) (incorrectly claiming that recoveries by 
public figures were minimal or nonexistent). 
 72. Redmond v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 14 N.E.2d 636 (N.Y. 1938); Flake v. Greensboro News 
Co., 195 S.E. 55 (N.C. 1938); Loftus v. Greenwich Lithographing Co., 182 N.Y.S. 428 (App. Div. 1920); 
Marks v. Jaffa, 26 N.Y.S. 908 (Sup. Ct. 1893); Astaire v. Esquire Magazine, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 11, 1936, at 
760; Manola Gets an Injunction, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1890, at 3; see also SAMUEL H. WANDELL, THE 
LAW OF THE THEATRE:  A TREATISE UPON THE LEGAL RELATIONS OF ACTORS, MANAGERS, AND 
AUDIENCES 110–11 (1891). 
 73. Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 120 S.W. 364 (Ky. 1909); Eliot v. Jones, 120 N.Y.S. 989 (Sup. 
Ct. 1910); Edison v. Edison Polyform & Mfg. Co., 67 A. 392 (N.J. Ch. 1907); Mackenzie v. Soden Mineral 
Springs, 18 N.Y.S. 240 (Sup. Ct. 1891); see also ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 30–44. 
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“unwarranted publicity” about oneself.74  The New York Times thought the president 
and prominent businessmen like J.P. Morgan should be able to stop the taking of and 
circulation of their images.75  The 1902 issue of Current Literature advocated that 
everyone, including the president, should have a right of privacy that would bar 
others from taking unauthorized photographs of them even when they appeared in 
public.76  In 1905, the Supreme Court of Georgia emphasized that the “mere fact that 
a man aspires to public office or holds public office” does not mean that he gives up 
the right to control how his picture will appear in public.77 
The right of privacy—contrary to subsequent revisionist claims—allowed the 
recovery of professional damages, as well as personal ones.  Courts considered lost 
endorsement fees and other professional harms under privacy-based claims.  
Celebrity endorsements were already common by the late 1800s and public figures 
who commercialized their identities were not limited to dignitary or emotional 
injuries.  From the beginning, public figures were able to recover for professional 
and economic injuries.78  
While it is not easy to determine many of the final recoveries in early litigation 
because case files have been lost, there is evidence that many public figures received 
significant recoveries under privacy claims, including for professional damages.  A 
number of actors who did not claim any mental distress recovered damages, even 
when the images circulated were ones they had approved of being taken, and 
sometimes even when the specific images used were ones they themselves had 
approved to be circulated to the press as publicity stills.79  In 1908, the actor Felicite 
Skiff Riddle recovered $3,000 (approximately $75,000 today) when her image was 
 
 74. Bell v. Birmingham Broad. Co., 96 So. 2d 263, 265–66 (Ala. 1957); see also supra notes 40–
47 & accompanying text (discussing right of privacy as synonymous with the right to stop “unwarranted 
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 75. The Right of Privacy, supra note 40, at 8. 
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 77. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 80 (Ga. 1905). 
 78. See, e.g., Redmond v. Columbia Pictures, 14 N.E.2d 636 (N.Y. 1938); Judgment, Record on 
Appeal at 75, Franklin v. Columbia Pictures, 2 N.E. 2d 691 (N.Y. 1936); Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of Am., 
103 N.E. 1108 (N.Y. 1913); Franklin v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 284 N.Y.S. 96 (App. Div. 1935); Loftus 
v. Greenwich Lithographic Co., 182 N.Y.S. 428 (App. Div. 1920); Riddle v. MacFadden, 115 N.Y.S. 1142 
(App. Div. 1909) (affirming jury award); Riddle v. MacFadden, 101 N.Y.S. 606 (App. Div. 1906); see 
also Gladys Loftus Wins, N.Y. CLIPPER, June 9, 1920, at 32; Jack Binns to Get $12,500, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
31, 1913, at 5; ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 32–35, 194–95 nn.6-10. 
 79. See, e.g., Redmond v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 1 N.Y.S.2d 643 (App. Div. 1937); Complaint, 
Case on Appeal at 4-9, Redmond v. Columbia Pictures, 14 N.E.2d 636 (N.Y. App. Div. 1938) (No. 859), 
case files available at https://perma.cc/KH5L-GG4H; Testimony of Jack Redmond, Redmond v. 
Columbia Pictures Corp., 1. N.Y.S.2d 643 (App. Div. 1937); Loftus v. Greenwich Lithographic Co., 182 
N.Y.S. 428 (App. Div. 1920); Complaint, Case on Appeal at 5–9, Loftus, 182 N.Y.S. 428 (on file with the 
New York State Library); Complaint, Record on Appeal at 6, Flake v. Greensboro News, 195 S.E. 55 
(N.C. 1938) (No. 744) (on file with author); Affidavit of Harry E. Malcolm in Opposition to Plaintiff’s 
Motion for an Order Enjoining Defendants, Astaire v. Esquire (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1936) (No. 1083) (July 10, 
1935, letter from Kenneth E. Hallam of RKO Radio Pictures) (on file with author).  See also Gladys Loftus 
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used in an advertisement without her permission.80  One of the most famous people 
of the early 1900s was Jack Binns, who became internationally known for saving 
thousands of lives at sea by using then-new telegraph technology after a maritime 
accident. Binns sued for a violation of his right of privacy when his name and 
likeness were “used” (in the form of an actor playing him) in a movie based on his 
real-life actions.  At the time of the film, Binns was actively commercializing his 
identity in a show at Coney Island inspired by his heroic acts.  Although Binns 
claimed some distress at being portrayed in the movie―which he stated he had not 
watched―there was little doubt that he was comfortable with having his name and 
image used to publicize and profit from professional endeavors.  He too won his case, 
and in 1911 was awarded $12,500 (approximately $300,000 today) for the violation 
of his right of privacy.81  In 1936, a professional bullfighter recovered $5,000 (the 
equivalent of $90,000 today) when his public performance was used in a newsreel 
without his consent.82  These examples demonstrate that public personalities, far 
from being left out of privacy protections, were some of its biggest beneficiaries. 
IV. THE ROAD TO TRANSFERABILITY 
Despite privacy laws being far more capacious than is usually thought, there was 
something significant that privacy laws did not do:  They were not transferable and 
therefore could not be owned by third parties or survive a person’s death.83  This was 
true even though the right of privacy, from the beginning, was often described as a 
property right―albeit one rooted in self-ownership.  In 1911, a Missouri appellate 
court concluded that the right of privacy existed under that state’s common law, and 
that the right conveyed a “property right of value” in the “exclusive right to [one’s] 
picture.”84  Numerous other cases that either supported the adoption of a right of 
privacy or actually adopted such a right rooted it in property.85  Warren and Brandeis 
relied in part on common law copyright to justify the adoption of a right to privacy, 
and protection against unauthorized uses of a person’s name and likeness.86  Some 
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courts also analogized to trademark claims as a basis to control the use of a person’s 
name or likeness in the context of one’s professional career or business.87  
But, even if treated as property for some purposes, the right of privacy was never 
thought of as being a transferable form of property.88  Because of the unique status 
of one’s body, name, and likeness, even when understood as property, it was not 
alienable.  Although transferability is a feature of most forms of property, we limit 
the transferability of property for a variety of reasons, particularly when it is 
inseparable from a person or against public policy to allow sales or transfers.  For 
example, we bar or limit transferability in the context of ownership of people, body 
parts, and endangered animals.89  
In 1935, in a case that foreshadowed the dispute to come in Haelan, the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Hanna Manufacturing v. Hillerich & Bradsby held that 
rights to a person’s own name and signature could not be transferred to anyone else.90  
In Hanna, the manufacturer of the Louisville Slugger autograph bats sued a 
competitor that used players’ names on its own line of bats.  The Court of Appeals 
concluded that although the baseball players had a “property” right in their names, 
this right was not “vendible in gross so as to pass from purchaser to purchaser.”91  
Despite the lack of transferability, the court still allowed an injunction against the 
use of the players’ names on the bats to the extent it suggested a false endorsement 
by the players (who had not agreed to the use).92  
Transferability then was not required for the players (or the companies who made 
licensing deals with them) to protect themselves.  Nevertheless, some saw 
advantages in making the rights transferable.  Many who misread Haelan as creating 
a new, transferable right in a person’s name and likeness did so accidentally, but 
some had motivations for reading it that way.  Some advocates saw opportunity in 
the Haelan dicta that suggested that a new, alienable right might exist.  Such a 
transferable right could be useful, particularly for Hollywood studios, Broadway 
producers, and the heirs of famous deceased celebrities.   
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 91. Id. 
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One such advocate was Melville Nimmer, who would go on to become a great 
copyright scholar.  In Nimmer’s influential 1954 article, The Right of Publicity, he 
contended that Haelan created something new, and filled a gap in the law.93  His 
description of the failings of privacy law turn out not to have been accurate, and he 
glossed over many alternative claims the competing gum and candy companies could 
have brought to enforce their contractual rights against each other (as well as against 
the players).  Nevertheless, his narrative about the differences between privacy law 
and the right of publicity stuck.94 
Nimmer had good reasons for wanting to read Haelan a certain way.  At the time 
he was writing, he was an attorney for Paramount Pictures.  His article focused on 
promoting the interests of the Hollywood studios in the aftermath of the invalidation 
of the long-term studio contracts that had held actors hostage to a particular studio.  
These contracts had been struck down in California courts in the early 1940s, and the 
studios were looking for other options to control their actors.95  A transferable right 
of publicity would achieve this goal because studios could require actors to transfer 
the rights to them, leading to the studios owning the actors’ names, likenesses, and 
voices.  This would give the studios at least as much control over the actors as they 
had had during the heyday of the studio star system, and likely far more.96 
Some clues about the aims of Nimmer’s article―other than who his employer at 
the time was―stem from the examples he provided in the article.  He was not 
concerned about the baseball players involved in the Haelan dispute nor about actors, 
he was advocating for a tool for studios to assert greater control over their actors.  
Nimmer gave an example of how the right of publicity could help the studios stop an 
actress from booking bathing suit advertisements without the studio’s approval.97  
From Nimmer’s perspective, only the studio should get to decide what 
advertisements one of its actors could do, and perhaps only it should reap the 
rewards.  If a right of publicity were transferable, then an actor’s rights to her own 
name, likeness, voice, and broader identity could be transferred to the studio, and she 
would no longer have a say in such matters.  Such questions (and many others) would 
be only for the studio to decide.  Another often forgotten aspect of Nimmer’s article 
is that he advocated for animals, like the dog that played Lassie, to have rights of 
publicity too―so the studios could have transferred to them the animal actors’ rights, 
as well as those of its stable of human actors.98 
This history makes it ironic that the main union seeking to protect actors―SAG-
AFTRA―is today one of the proponents of spreading and expanding right of 
publicity laws that include provisions that define the right as being “freely 
alienable”―making it possible for their own members to lose control over their own 
 
 93. Nimmer, supra note 16, 204 & passim. 
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ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TURN, 42 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 277 (2019)  
300 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [42:3 
identities, forever.99  Recently, the union has expressed some awareness of these 
concerns, and the latest version of a bill proposed in New York includes at least some 
protection against the assignment in perpetuity of children’s rights.100  However, as 
long as the rights are made transferable, SAG’s members and everyone else will be 
at risk of losing ownership of our identities.101   
In addition to likely being influenced by his employer’s interests, Nimmer wanted 
to write an ambitious and influential law review article.  He was particularly 
impressed with Warren and Brandeis’s article on The Right of Privacy, and the 
impact that the article had had on the direction of the law.102  Nimmer already knew 
he wanted a career in academia, and suggesting that a major new right had been 
created in Haelan, and that such a right was both warranted and necessary would 
make a bigger splash than a more straightforward contract-based interpretation of 
Haelan.  It would also be more impressive than suggesting a menu of alternative 
doctrinal options that companies could exercise under current laws to stop pesky 
baseball players from double-booking trading card appearances with more than one 
company.  Whether intentionally or not, this likely skewed Nimmer’s analysis of 
both Haelan and the law that came before it.103 
Another highly influential article in the right of publicity’s turn to becoming a 
form of intellectual property was published six years after Nimmer’s article, by 
Harold Gordon, a prominent Chicago lawyer.  Gordon’s Right of Property in Name, 
Likeness, Personality and History was published in 1960, the same year as William 
Prosser’s now famous Privacy article.104  Prosser, in his effort to make sense of what 
seemed like a series of irreconcilable decisions under privacy laws, had concluded 
that the right of privacy was really composed of four different torts:  the tort of 
intrusion upon seclusion, the tort of public disclosure of private facts, the tort of 
placing a person in a false light, and of particular relevance here, the tort of 
“appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.”105  
Prosser concluded that this misappropriation branch of privacy law was one and the 
same with the right of publicity described in Haelan.106  
Where Prosser saw harmony, Gordon, like Nimmer, saw opportunity in the right 
of publicity and the right of privacy diverging.  If the right of publicity provided an 
IP-like right in a person’s personality that was transferable, inheritable, and focused 
on commercial exploitation, then Gordon’s clients would have causes of action in 
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cases that courts were otherwise rejecting.  Gordon represented descendants of the 
famous gangster Al Capone.  Capone’s sister, wife, and son wanted to stop, or at 
least be compensated for, and control the content of biographical movies and 
television series about their deceased relative, including the hit television show, The 
Untouchables.  Gordon also represented Nathan Leopold, who had been convicted 
of the infamous murder and kidnapping of a 14-year old boy.  Leopold objected to 
the use of his name and life story in the novel, play, and movie Compulsion.  Neither 
Capone’s heirs nor Leopold had claims under the laws at the time for these uses.107 
Gordon was at the forefront of advocating for postmortem rights, and for shifting 
to a more IP-like framework.  He thought claims should accrue even in the context 
of uses of a person’s identity in fictional works.  Just as authors should be paid if 
their copyrighted work is used, he thought his clients should be paid for uses of their 
or their dead relatives’ identities.  He called for a “quasi-contractual right to recover 
for unjust enrichment against anyone who appropriated the name, likeness, life-story, 
and personality of another in a work of fiction that was distributed through the usual 
commercial channels.”108 
Gordon’s advocacy for something different, whether a “right of publicity” or what 
he sometimes described as a “right of property in name, likeness, personality and 
history,” was expressly driven by his efforts to avoid the limits on privacy laws.  He 
wanted to escape its short one-year statute of limitations in Illinois, its inability to 
transfer to heirs, and its speech-related limits on uses in creative works.  In the 
process of advocating on behalf of his clients in the form of his law review article, 
Gordon erroneously described the right of privacy as only applying to private figures, 
and as not providing significant recoveries for professional or commercial injuries.  
Although Gordon’s assessment of the privacy cases does not withstand scrutiny, 
Gordon’s view that privacy was about protecting “injury to feelings,” while the right 
of publicity was about protecting the “pecuniary value” of a person’s identity began 
to dominate all other discourse.109  The U.S. Supreme Court cited to Gordon’s article 
and adopted his view of the differences between privacy and publicity laws to support 
its ground-shifting decision in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting―the 
decision in which the right of publicity was truly severed from privacy law, and 
entered the IP pantheon.110 
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V. ZACCHINI AND THE IP TURN 
In the Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard 
Broadcasting, the Court both created and cemented the right of publicity’s break 
from the right of privacy and its placement into the intellectual property framework.  
It was Zacchini, not Haelan, that created what we understand today as the right of 
publicity. 
Zacchini remains the only right of publicity case to reach the Supreme Court. 
Zacchini involved a human cannonball act that was filmed at a local fair, and then 
broadcast on the nightly news.  Hugo Zacchini’s entire act was shown―albeit it only 
being fifteen seconds in length.111  Scholars and courts usually cite to Zacchini 
because of the Court’s rejection of a First Amendment defense to a right of publicity 
claim.  But the decision did more than this―it also established a particular view of 
the right of publicity, one that had not been widely adopted before that time.  
Zacchini is often described as a quasi-copyright case.  But dismissing it so 
quickly―as not a right of publicity case―is a mistake.  Even though the case was 
brought under Ohio’s common law right of privacy, a majority of the Supreme Court 
insisted on highlighting in the decision, and in the oral arguments, that the case was 
a right of publicity case.  During the arguments, the Justices repeatedly corrected the 
litigants that this was a case about publicity rights, not privacy rights.112  
It was the Court’s misunderstanding of Ohio law, combined with the unusual facts 
of the case and an effort to distinguish it from the Court’s decision in Time v. Hill, 
that generated and entrenched the differences between the right of privacy and the 
right of publicity that remain today.113  No amicus briefs were filed with the Court, 
and this absence combined with the way the case had been litigated and decided by 
the Ohio courts, led to there being little to no briefing of the underlying state interests 
supporting the alleged Ohio right of publicity.114  This absence likely exacerbated 
the Court’s misunderstanding of Ohio’s right of privacy―a state law issue about 
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which it had no basis to opine.  The Supreme Court of Ohio had held that Zacchini’s 
claim was under Ohio’s right of privacy, and the misappropriation branch of that 
right, which it deemed synonymous with the right of publicity under state law.  The 
Ohio court concluded that Zacchini could make out a prima facie case for a violation 
of his right of privacy for the use of his likeness and performance, but concluded that 
the station’s use of the clip was newsworthy and therefore not actionable.115  
Zacchini was heard by the Supreme Court despite several law clerks 
recommending against reviewing the case.116  Justice Lewis Powell likely regretted  
his fourth, and deciding vote to hear the case―on the basis that it looked 
“interesting” and “fun to work on”:117 
Figure 3.  Lewis F. Powell Jr., Certiorari Petition Conference Notes, Oct. 23, 1976, 
in Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers. 
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Powell dissented in the five-to-four decision, and was deeply troubled by the 
majority’s reasoning.  He thought the holding and standard offered by the majority 
was vague and would have a chilling effect on newsgatherers.118 
The ultimate decision in Zacchini rejecting the First Amendment defense in the 
context of news was driven in large part by one central concern―a concern 
epitomized by Justice Harry Blackmun’s visit to the symphony two nights before the 
oral arguments in the case. (His program from the event is in Figure 4 below). 
Blackmun worried that if the news could broadcast performances like Zacchini’s 
without permission, there was nothing to prevent broadcasts of entire symphonies or 

































Figure 4.  The program states:  “The taking of photographs and the use of recording equipment are not 
allowed.”  Image of the Program from Gustav Mahler, Symphony No. 2 in C Minor, Minnesota 
Orchestra, John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts (Apr. 23, 1977), in Harry A. Blackmun 
Papers. 
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This framing skewed the Court’s understanding of the right of publicity, and led 
the Court to articulate justifications for the right that largely only apply in the context 
of performance-based cases.  The Court described the “State’s interest in permitting 
a ‘right of publicity’” as one based “in protecting the proprietary interest of the 
individual in his act.”120  This protection incentivizes the production of works of 
“entertainment” in ways “analogous to the goals of patent and copyright law.”121  The 
Court concluded that providing Zacchini (and others) a right of publicity provided 
an “economic incentive for him to make the investment required to produce a 
performance of interest to the public.  This same consideration underlies the patent 
and copyright laws long enforced by this Court.”122 
The Court emphasized Zacchini’s pecuniary interests over his emotional and 
reputational ones, contending that his claim had “little to do with protecting feelings 
or reputation,” and instead was about “reap[ing] the reward of his endeavors.”123  In 
addition to worrying about a substitutionary effect on Zacchini’s act from the news 
broadcast, and concluding that the right of publicity provided an incentive effect for 
performers like Zacchini, the court also suggested that labor-reward and unjust 
enrichment rationales justified the right.  Quoting from an essay by Harry Kalven Jr., 
the Court noted that Zacchini was “ordinarily” paid for his performances.  For the 
justices in the majority, “[n]o social purpose is served by having the defendant get 
free some aspect of the plaintiff that would have market value, and for which he 
would normally pay.”124 
The Court remanded Zacchini’s case, where upon it settled on the second day of 
trial, without any determination of the facts, particularly whether the broadcast would 
have helped or hurt Zacchini’s career.  Both parties claimed victory.  The news 
station suggested that the small settlement amount―less than Zacchini had 
sought―demonstrated its continuing ability to show such clips.  Meanwhile, 
Zacchini claimed victory, and concluded that the settlement established that the 
station had no right to show his performance.125  Regardless of the parties’ views, 
there is no question that the Supreme Court’s decision in Zacchini forever altered our 
understanding of both the right of publicity and the right of privacy. 
The Court turned the right of publicity into a form of intellectual property, under 
a distinct moniker.  The Court explicitly analogized the right of publicity to patent 
 
 120. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573.  
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 573, 576. 
 123. Id. at 573. 
 124. Id. at 572–78, n.10.  The citation to and reliance on Kalven’s essay is somewhat surprising 
given that Kalven’s essay was largely critical of privacy-based torts, and the oft-quoted language that the 
Supreme Court adopted was an effort to articulate a possible justification for Prosser’s misappropriation 
branch of the privacy torts, rather than an affirmative effort by Kalven to develop such a right.  See Harry 
Kalven Jr., Privacy in Tort Law―Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 
331–41 (1966); see also ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 80, 213 n.26. 
 125. ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 80–81, 208 n. 32; see also Human Cannonball, WEWS Settle Suit 
in Out-of-Court Pact, PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 23, 1979, at 2-B; Mary Strassmeyer, Inflation Hits the Courts, 
PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 23, 1979, at 3-A. 
ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TURN, 42 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 277 (2019)  
306 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [42:3 
and copyright laws, and imported the justifications used for these IP laws, 
particularly the incentive rationale and the labor-reward rubric, to justify the state 
law.  Although these bases may have some traction in performance-based cases, like 
Zacchini, they do not map well onto the right of publicity more broadly outside of 
this context.126  The Supreme Court’s shift in the framework for the right of publicity 
from the privacy-based origins rooted in the individual to a broader IP basis justified 
a far more expansive right―one that could survive death, that was broader in scope, 
encompassing even the mere evocation of a person’s identity, and that started from 
a presumption that uses should be paid for.127 
A few months after the Zacchini decision issued, Elvis Presley died―adding fuel 
to the fire started by the Supreme Court.  Zacchini strongly influenced courts 
deciding the many lawsuits involving who, if anyone, would own Elvis after his 
death.  The Court’s analogizing of the right to copyright and patents strongly pushed 
courts and legislatures toward accepting postmortem rights of publicity.128  
Litigation involving dead celebrities was already pending at the time Zacchini was 
decided.  The heirs of Bela Lugosi, who famously played Dracula, had sued 
Universal Studios over uses of Lugosi’s likeness on merchandise, claiming that the 
rights to his name and likeness survived his death.  The California Supreme Court 
decided Lugosi v. Universal Pictures shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court issued its 
decision in Zacchini.  While the majority of the state court held that Lugosi’s rights 
did not survive death, Chief Justice Rose Bird was convinced that Lugosi’s rights to 
his name and likeness should survive death under the logic of Zacchini.129  She 
advocated for using the copyright framework of life plus fifty years (later raised to 
seventy years) for postmortem rights of publicity.130  Although the majority of the 
California Supreme Court did not agree with her, her view ultimately prevailed, as 
the California legislature (and soon thereafter the Tennessee legislature) passed 
legislation creating postmortem rights of publicity.131 
In addition to shoring up expansions in the scope of the right and supporting a 
survivable right that passed on to heirs at the identity-holder’s death, Zacchini also 
established an influential precedent that the right of publicity could apply in the 
context of noncommercial speech without running afoul of the First Amendment, 
even in the usually preferred context of news reporting.  At the same time that the IP 
turn exacerbated conflicts with free speech, it undercut the ability of the First 
Amendment to function as an effective defense in such cases, for reasons that I will 
consider in more depth shortly.  Separate from the First Amendment analysis itself, 
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the expansions in the right (beyond actual uses of a person’s name or likeness, and 
after death) also increased its clashes with free speech.   
VI. THE AFTERMATH OF THE IP TURN 
The right of publicity’s IP turn in Zacchini and thereafter raises three major 
challenges that confront us today with regard to right of publicity laws.  The shift in 
the framework from a right rooted in the underlying person (whether understood as 
a property right or not) to something external to the person that is understood as an 
IP right, like a copyright or patent, has made it possible for people to lose control and 
ownership of their own identities.  The paradigm shift to an IP right also has 
undermined the role of the First Amendment in limiting right of publicity claims, and 
set up a more problematic relationship with the competing rights of copyright 
holders, their licensees, and the public’s otherwise acceptable use of copyrighted 
works. 
The shift to an IP framework need not have created these problems.  And many 
of these problems reflect and highlight challenges in IP law more generally.  Nor 
should the IP box be understood as a one-size-fits-all regime.  There are many 
variations among IP laws, and for good reason.  Despite the variety of possible ways 
to import the right of publicity into an IP-based rubric, the right of publicity’s 
designation as IP has not been done in a nuanced way.  It has lacked consideration 
of how the right of publicity differs from other types of IP, particularly copyrights 
and patents to which the Supreme Court analogized the right.  Instead of facilitating 
such analysis, the shift to understanding the right of publicity as a form of intellectual 
property has obstructed deeper interrogation of its aims and justifications.  Right of 
publicity laws also lack many of the advantages of the federal IP statutes.  Right of 
publicity laws are not uniform or consistent across states, and they lack  the limits 
and defenses that federal copyright, patent, and trademark laws provide.  Courts have 
largely ignored these significant differences when analyzing right of publicity laws.  
The shift to the IP rubric therefore has papered over deeper thinking about 
appropriate constitutional and federal limits on the enforcement of right of publicity 
laws. 
A. TURNING PEOPLE INTO TRANSFERABLE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
The first problem with the shift to the IP framework is that it turned people into a 
form of intellectual property.  Although the right of privacy was often thought of in 
property terms―as having a property right in one’s own name or likeness with a 
corresponding right to exclude others from using that property―it was never thought 
to be a transferable right.  The reason for this inalienability was intuitive, and almost 
too obvious to require explanation.  The right of privacy was a right over oneself, 
something that could never be parted from one’s being.  One’s likeness, name, and 
voice were inextricably attached to oneself.  The property right was in the form of 
self-ownership, rather than ownership of an external thing (whether it be tangible or 
intangible).  Even if it were possible to transfer ownership over oneself to another 
person or company, it was viewed as akin to selling oneself into slavery or indentured 
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servitude, and produced the exact opposite result of what the right of privacy was 
intended to protect.132 
The same remains true in the context of the right of publicity.  Treating our right 
of publicity as freely alienable like other IP rights, particularly copyrights and 
patents, makes it possible for each of us to lose ownership of our own names, 
likenesses, voices, and other indicia of our identities.  The property rubric is not itself 
the problem.  Although property is most often freely transferable, alienability has 
long been limited when it comes to contested commodities, transfers that produce 
negative externalities, and those that implicate fundamental rights.  Various laws bar 
transferability or limit it in the context of ownership of people, human organs, 
historic buildings, hazardous waste, voting rights, and protected or endangered 
animals (including limits on the sale of tusks and feathers).133  
Understanding the right of publicity as a form of IP did not require that it be 
treated as a transferable form of property, or at least not one without any limits on 
such transfers.  But because of Zacchini’s analogizing the right to copyrights and 
patents, courts and legislatures have simply presumed or adopted largely unfettered 
transferability.  This unthinking importation is dangerous, and also leaves out 
anything similar to copyright’s termination provision.134  Similarly, states (and 
courts) have often adopted a postmortem period that mirrors (or exceeds) that of 
copyright law without bothering to justify why the term should be so long, or should 
be imported from copyright, rather than patent law, or from either of these regimes.135  
To determine the appropriate term for postmortem rights, and decide who should be 
able to hold such rights (and even if they should exist), one needs to think more 
deeply about why we should create postmortem rights in a person’s identity in the 
first place.136 
If the right of publicity is truly alienable, such transfers could take place even in 
involuntary contexts, as they do in the context of patents and copyrights.  This means 
that the rights to your own name, likeness, and voice could be transferred to creditors 
and ex-spouses in bankruptcies, divorces, and to pay judgments.137  Voluntary 
transfers may seem less problematic than these forced ones, but even voluntary 
transfers of one’s own identity are a troubling possibility.  This is particularly so 
given the differential bargaining power of parties to contracts, the prevalence of 
contracts of adhesion, ever-changing terms of service online that we agree to simply 
 
 132. For further discussion of these issues, see ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 115–37; Rothman, supra 
note 89 passim. 
 133. See ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 125; Rothman, supra note 89, at 208–33; see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES) § 3.4 (2000); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY 
LAW:  RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 450, 461 (4th ed. 2006); Fennell, supra note 89 passim; Radin, 
supra note 89, at 1853–55; Rose-Ackerman, supra note 89, at 942–61. 
 134. See 17 U.S.C. § 203. 
 135. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 3344.1 (g) (providing a 70-year postmortem term); Indiana Code 
§ 32-36-1-8 (providing a 100-year postmortem term); Tenn. Code § 47-25-1104 (allowing indefinite 
continuation of right if exploited); see also Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 446–47 (Bird, J., 
dissenting) (advocating for adoption of fifty-year duration on basis of copyright term). 
 136. For additional discussion of postmortem rights see ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 108–09, 112, 
136, 184; Rothman, supra note 100, at 592–97, 598–99. 
 137. ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 122, 216–17 nn.14–15; Rothman, supra note 89, at 199–202. 
ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TURN, 42 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 277 (2019)  
2019] THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TURN 309 
by continuing to use various websites, and the ability of parents to assign forever the 
rights of their children’s own identities to third parties.138  
Such possibilities mean that the person upon whom the rights are based―what I 
have dubbed the “identity-holder”―could be different from the person who owns 
the rights―the “publicity-holder.”139  Whether considered voluntary or involuntary, 
the prospect of losing ownership of one’s public identity forever is a chilling 
prospect.  This is especially so because the scope of what can be owned by someone 
other than the underlying identity-holder is much greater than is usually thought.  
What is owned by a publicity-holder is not just the right to the earnings from various 
uses of the underlying person’s identity, as is often claimed.  A person or company 
who owns another’s right of publicity can control the identity-holder’s freedom of 
association, freedom of speech, and even her liberty to appear in public and decide 
her own future.  
Recall Nimmer’s primary example of the benefits of adopting a right of 
publicity―studios could use it to stop an actress from appearing in a bathing suit 
advertisement that it didn’t want her to appear in.  Only the studio, he contended, 
should get to select which advertisements she could appear in.  If the studio owned 
the actress’s right of publicity, it could not only bar her from appearing in such ads, 
but also from making unapproved public appearances, and taking unauthorized 
acting jobs.  A publicity-holder’s rights could extend even further.  Although the 
studio could not force actors to physically appear, it could use their images to create 
computer-generated performances.  If the studio owned an actor’s right of publicity, 
she would not be able to complain of a right of publicity violation if her performance 
was recreated in an advertisement, video game, or motion picture.  The publicity-
holder―here, the studio―would have “authorized” these uses.  
Consider a contemporary hypothetical involving the pop star Ariana Grande.  
Suppose that as part of an onerous agreement she signed with her first manager, 
Grande assigned in perpetuity her right of publicity to him.  This would make Grande 
the identity-holder of her own identity, but not the publicity-holder, which would 
now be her manager.  Grande is vegan and may wish to encourage people not to eat 
or use animal products.  Suppose Grande wishes to expressly endorse PETA (People 
for the Ethical Treatment of Animals), appear at its events, be on a billboard for the 
organization, and encourage donations.  Her manager (even if not her current 
manager), as the publicity-holder, could potentially enjoin her from doing any of 
these things.  He could certainly stop her from appearing in advertisements for a tofu 
brand, like Nasoya.  At the same time, the manager could force her to virtually appear 
in advertisements for Oscar Mayer lunch meat―something she would find 
anathema.  The manager could potentially approve the digital reanimation of her in 
ads, TV shows, and even create new songs using recordings of her voice.  Even 
though some other laws might keep the manager from being wholly unfettered in 
 
 138. ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 119–22, 215–16 nn.9–13; Rothman, supra note 89, at 191–99, 234–
37. 
 139. I developed this terminology in Rothman, supra note 89, at 187; see also ROTHMAN, supra note 
1, at 116. 
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doing so, a transferable right of publicity would grant him the power to do all these 
things.140 
It is no wonder then that the only court to explicitly consider a motion to transfer 
a debtor’s right of publicity to a creditor called such a transfer akin to “involuntary 
servitude.”141  This makes it particularly bizarre that SAG-AFTRA is supportive of 
such transferability.  It is many of its members that will be most affected, negatively, 
by such transferability.  While its most powerful and successful members, perhaps 
its top earners, could negotiate more favorable terms, and have some tax-advantaged 
strategies that flow from having transferable rights, most of its members will be hurt 
by unfettered transferability.  Additionally, the rest of us will be left worse off, 
without even the protection of a union’s collective bargaining agreements or 
advocacy that can sometimes prevent overreaching by producers, social media 
companies, managers, sports leagues, and employers. 
The law should prohibit the transfer of ownership of a person’s identity.  As I 
have written, allowing such transferability “burdens fundamental rights, works at 
cross-purposes with the right of publicity’s purported objectives, sometimes forcibly 
commodifies a person, and is inefficient.”142  Some have suggested that we have 
nothing to worry about because no court would enforce a contract that transferred a 
person’s identity.143  Relying on such a hope, however, is unwise. Courts have 
already suggested a willingness to enforce assignments of publicity rights in limited 
contexts.144  The author of the dominant treatise on the right of publicity, J. T. 
McCarthy, has concluded that even a total assignment of a person’s right of publicity 
cannot be invalidated under existing contract law principles absent a showing of 
duress.145 
We are putting in place laws that expressly allow free alienability in perpetuity of 
a person’s right of publicity, and are doing so with full awareness of what that means.  
It is a dangerous business to hope that the laws being advocated for will not pass 
constitutional muster or that they will be invalidated by contract law.  And on a more 
mundane level, business transactions, tax bills, and inheritance regimes are being 
 
 140. This example is adapted from ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 130–31.  Both federal regulations 
and federal and state trademark and unfair competition laws limit false endorsements, and advertisements 
that deceive consumers about whether a person, usually a celebrity, actual uses the product.  But, it is not 
clear that there can be a false endorsement claim if a publicity-holder authorized the use.  This complexity 
itself points toward the right of publicity not being alienable. 
 141. Goldman v. Simpson, No. SC03-6340, slip op. at 12–13 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 2006); see 
also ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 118; Rothman, supra note 89, at 200, 212–17.  
 142. ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 115–37; Rothman, supra note 89 passim. 
 143. See, e.g., Stacey Dogan, Stirring the Pot:  A Response to Rothman’s Right of Publicity, 42 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 321 (2019).  
 144. See, e.g., Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 291 F. Supp. 242, 245–47 (E.D. Mo. 1968) (holding 
assignment of exclusive rights to baseball player’s identity enforceable over player’s objections); Cory v. 
Nintendo of Am., Inc. 592 N.Y.S.2d 6, 8–9 (App. Div. 1993) (holding that model’s agent had control of 
model’s right of publicity and could authorize uses over model’s objections); cf. Faloona ex rel. 
Fredrickson v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 799 F.2d 1000, 1005 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that photo release 
applied to reuse of photographs of children in pornographic magazine); Shields v. Gross, 448 N.E.2d 108, 
109, 111 (N.Y. 1983) (holding that actor Brooke Shields could not stop the continued use of photos of her 
as a child naked because her mother had consented to such uses). 
 145. MCCARTHY, supra note 17, § 10:14; see also ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 119–22, 136–37. 
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determined on the basis that such transferability is possible and will be enforced by 
the courts. 
Already athletes, aspiring musicians, models, reality television contestants, and 
sometimes average citizens have been asked to and have assigned their rights of 
publicity.  The NCAA, for example, as a condition of playing college sports, used to 
require student-athletes to sign a form that the NCAA claims transfers the players’ 
rights to their own names and likenesses to the NCAA forever, and in any context.146  
Such assignments are routine in a variety of fields, particularly in the adult 
entertainment context, and used to be standard in reality television contestant 
contracts in which participants assigned their rights of publicity to the producers in 
perpetuity.147 
Just because we have not yet seen the worst-case scenarios played out in the public 
eye, does not mean they will not arise.  Publicity-holders may hesitate to enforce the 
full extent of their rights for a variety of reasons, out of fear of bad publicity 
(particularly if a major performer is involved), or concerns of costly litigation.  But 
it may take only one major case where it is worth fighting over, and that comes out 
in favor of a publicity-holder over an identity-holder, to work a sea-change in 
enforcement patterns and the law.   
Take one example that was recently brought to my attention at a media law 
conference:  As mentioned, the adult entertainment industry routinely has required 
its actors to assign the rights to their names and likenesses to the production 
companies and producers in any context and in perpetuity.  These companies have 
long used these agreements to assert their performers’ right of publicity claims along 
with their own copyright claims in infringement suits.148  I was asked about the 
following scenario―a number of these adult entertainment performers have crossed 
over to doing more mainstream entertainment work.  The companies know they 
could enforce their prior assignments with these actors.  These contracts by their own 
terms would give the publicity-holders (the adult entertainment companies) the right 
to block the actors’ future work, or to at least collect some of the payments for the 
actors’ work.  The companies could also digitally reanimate the performers in new 
works now that they are more widely known, and would likely refuse to appear in 
new pornographic works.  Rather than being far-fetched, this is what a freely 
alienable right of publicity allows.  Turning the right of publicity into IP need not 
 
 146. See, e.g., Complaint at 6–7, Thrower v. NCAA, No. CV-10-00632 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2010); 
Complaint at 5–6, O’Bannon Jr. v. NCAA, No. CV-09-3329 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2009).  The NCAA’s 
revised form now has a more limited transfer of rights. 
 147. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2007); Complaint at 4, 
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Netsaits, B.C., No. 10-1773 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2010); Complaint at 8, 18, 22–23, 26, 
33, 44–45, Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (No. CV-02-7624); 
Cory v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 592 N.Y.S.2d 6, 8–9 (App. Div. 1993); Release, America’s Got Talent, at 
6 (granting exclusive rights in perpetuity to contestant’s “name, likeness, voice . . . sounds, signature, 
[and] biographical data” in all contexts) (on file with author); Release, The Apprentice, at 2 (same) (on 
file with author). See also ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 119–22, 215–16 nn. 9–13; Rothman, supra note 89, 
at 195–99, & nn.41–56. 
 148. See supra note 147. 
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inevitably lead to unfettered transferability, but so far it has been interpreted as doing 
so. 
B. THE IP EXCEPTION TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
The second major problem created by the turn toward the IP model for the right 
of publicity is its increased collision with free speech.  The current analysis for First 
Amendment defenses in right of publicity cases is, simply put, a mess.149  But that is 
a story for another day.  Here, I want to focus on the fact that placing the right of 
publicity in the IP box shored up its strength, and led to an expansion in its scope, 
thereby increasing clashes with free speech.  At the same time, its status as IP has 
undercut the effectiveness of First Amendment defenses in right of publicity cases.150 
The expansion of the right of publicity and the failure of the First Amendment to 
clearly rein it in has jeopardized our ability to honor, depict, criticize, and refer to 
real people that form part of our history, culture, and lives.151  The IP turn has 
exacerbated this not only by supporting a more expansive view of what the right of 
publicity covers, but because First Amendment defenses to IP-related infringement 
claims have been analyzed with greater deference to the property-holders’ interests.  
There is less First Amendment scrutiny of IP claims than there is in the context of 
other content-based laws.  I have termed this the “IP Exception” to the First 
Amendment.152  It is not an absolute exception to the speech protections of the First 
Amendment, like those for obscenity, true threats, incitement, and child 
pornography.  Nevertheless, while not exempted from First Amendment review, IP 
laws get differential treatment.  Restrictions on the use of others’ IP are not subject 
to strict scrutiny as are most other speech restrictions.153 
Consider copyright as an example.  The First Amendment is virtually a 
nondefense to copyright claims.154  We allow copyright laws to restrict speech for 
three primary reasons:  First, because it is understood as an engine of free expression 
that supposedly creates more speech than it prohibits.  Second, the use of other 
people’s property is a disfavored manner of speech―you usually cannot use other 
people’s property (whether tangible or intangible) to make your speech.  Third, 
speech in the context of uses of others’ copyrighted works is thought of as less 
valuable because it is perceived as lacking originality.  Accordingly, it is viewed as 
adding less to the marketplace of ideas.155  
 
 149. ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 138–39, 145–54. 
 150. See id. at 138-59 for further in-depth discussion of these and other First Amendment issues. 
 151. Id. passim. 
 152. Id. at 143–45. 
 153. Id. at 143–45, 220–221 nn. 9–13. Cf. Sorrell v. IMS Health, 564 U.S. 552, 566 (2011). 
 154. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218–19 (2003) (suggesting that it will be only the rare 
instance in which an independent First Amendment analysis will apply in copyright cases). 
 155. Id.; see S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 535–41 (1987); 
Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First 
Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970); see also ROTHMAN, 
supra note 1, at 143–45, 220–21 nn.11–13. 
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Even if there is a legitimate basis for treating IP laws (such as copyright) 
differently when it comes to First Amendment analysis (something I am skeptical 
of), it is particularly problematic to do so in the context of right of publicity claims.156  
Why?  First, the justifications for doing so in the copyright context do not map on 
well to the right of publicity.  There is little basis for concluding that the right of 
publicity is an engine of expression like copyright laws are.  Outside of the 
anomalous performance cases like Zacchini, the broader right to control uses of one’s 
name, likeness, voice, and other indicia of identity does not provide the same type of 
incentives, nor is the same regime needed to encourage creative productions.  Those 
who are already successful in commercializing their identities, such as well-known 
musicians and actors, are already incentivized by being paid to perform, and are 
rewarded with increased salaries, fame, and awards.  Athletes with the most 
successful endorsement careers are the ones who collect large salaries.  This suggests 
that, if anything, the right of publicity is giving incentives to the wrong people.  
Those who most need incentives to keep going will not receive them, while those 
who already have more than enough incentive to continue what they are doing will 
have even more rewards heaped upon them.  Additionally, even without a right of 
publicity, false endorsement laws would remain and provide protection against 
unauthorized endorsements, therefore lucrative endorsement careers would remain 
largely unaffected.157  
So, it is not clear that the right of publicity incentivizes much of anything.  But if 
it does, and we are operating under a utilitarian, engine-of-free-expression model, we 
need to consider what the right of publicity incentivizes.  To the extent that it 
incentivizes anything, it might not be incentivizing more of what we want―whether 
that be more ideas in the marketplace, more creative works, or more performances.  
Instead, the right of publicity might be incentivizing the commercialization of 
personalities in and of themselves without incentivizing any broader contributions to 
society.  We may be encouraging more Paris Hiltons or Kardashians, who are 
“famous for being famous,” rather than people who are famous for their substantive 
accomplishments.  And if we do want to encourage more Hiltons and Kardashians, 
we need a better explanation for why, and need to consider what is lost in the 
process.158 
A second reason not to import the First Amendment deference given to other IP 
regimes is that the right of publicity poses a greater threat to free speech; it limits the 
ability to depict real people, and lacks the uniform speech-protective defenses that 
other IP regimes contain.  Although some state right of publicity statutes have 
 
 156. For a discussion of some concerns about the lesser First Amendment scrutiny in copyright 
cases, see Jennifer E. Rothman, Liberating Copyright:  Thinking Beyond Free Speech, 95 CORNELL L. 
REV. 463, 476–93 (2010); see also Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law:  What 
Copyright Has in Common with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and 
Telecommunication Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2000) (considering the anomalous First Amendment 
treatment of copyright laws). 
 157. I provide a more developed analysis (and critique) of the incentive rationale and other 
justifications for right of publicity laws in ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 99–112. 
 158. Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2010); ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 100–
02. 
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exemptions for certain types of uses, such as in sports or news broadcasts, many state 
publicity laws have no exemptions.  Nor have states adopted as part of a statutory 
structure something similar to copyright’s four-factor fair use analysis, or the 
nominative fair use or Rogers test analyses from trademark law that allow some uses 
of others’ marks and identities.  California has extracted one consideration from 
copyright’s fair use defense―transformativeness―in its First Amendment-based 
analysis in right of publicity cases, and some federal appellate courts have used the 
Rogers test or something similar to it to analyze First Amendment defenses in right 
of publicity cases.  But these tests are not consistent from state to state, and 
sometimes not even between state and federal courts in the same jurisdictions.159 
Not only do right of publicity laws lack the internal speech protections that justify 
lesser independent First Amendment scrutiny, but they also can pose a greater threat 
to free speech, as the laws are often far broader than other IP laws.  Trademark laws, 
for example, usually require a showing that a use of a similar mark is likely to cause 
confusion, and copyright law does not protect facts, yet the right of publicity requires 
no showing of likely confusion, and prohibits the use of facts about a person, such as 
their name, likeness, and other aspects of their identity. 
C. INCREASED CLASHES WITH COPYRIGHT LAW 
The third major challenge posed by the right of publicity’s shift to the IP 
framework is that we are increasingly seeing clashes with the rights of copyright 
owners and licensees.  There has long been a tension between the rights of privacy 
and publicity and the rights of copyright holders.  The ability to use copyrighted 
works and to make derivatives from them often depends on being able to use the 
likenesses and voices of those captured in them, for example, on film or in 
recordings.  These conflicts have become more frequent, especially as the right of 
publicity has expanded to encompass liability even when a person’s likeness, name, 
and voice are not used.   
Since most right of publicity claims arise in copyrighted works, how we navigate 
these conflicting interests is vitally important for finding the appropriate balance 
between subjects’ and creators’ interests.  The balancing of these competing interests 
has been skewed by treating right of publicity claims as analogous to and on equal 
footing with federal copyright law.160  For example, actors have been able to limit 
how producers and writers can reuse their own characters.  This occurred in Wendt 
v. Host International.161  In Wendt, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals allowed the 
actors who played the roles Norm and Cliff on the hit show Cheers to proceed with 
right of publicity claims against a licensee of Paramount Pictures that used robots 
based on those characters in Cheers-themed airport bars, even though the district 
 
 159. ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 146–47, 157–59.  
 160. For a more in-depth discussion of the conflict between copyright and right of publicity laws, 
see id. at 160–79. 
 161. Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 809–12 (9th Cir. 1997). 
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court had concluded that the robots did not look like the actors.162  You can judge for 
yourself: 
 
Federal law and the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution require that the 
right of publicity not “stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of 
the full purposes and objectives” of copyright law.163  Copyright law therefore should 
have preempted the right of publicity claims in Wendt.  The copyright holder had the 
right to authorize derivative works based on characters from its television series.  
And neither the copyright holder nor Host, the licensee, exploited or focused on the 
actors’ identities to promote the robots or airport bars.  Copyright holders need 
latitude to depict the characters in ways that may have similarities with the actors, or 
that will likely evoke the actors in viewers’ minds since viewers are likely to 
associate the characters with the actors who played them.  Writers and producers, 
and other copyright holders and licensees should not have to change characters’ body 
type, skin color, or hair color just to avoid right of publicity liability.  Part of the 
problem in Wendt, however, is not specifically one of copyright preemption, but 
instead with the expansion in the scope of the right of publicity itself.  The right of 
publicity has been stretched in some jurisdictions to apply even when a person’s 
name, likeness, and voice are never used, but are merely evoked in the minds of 
audiences.  This has increased the clash of right of publicity claims with those of 
copyright holders.164 
 
 162. Id.; Wendt v. Host Int’l, 1993 WL 13652548, No. 93-0142-R (C.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 1993); see 
also ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 93–96, 160, 172–73. 
 163. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 
U.S. 52, 67 (1941)); ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 164–67, 225 n.9.  The Copyright Act also has an express 
preemption provision, 17 U.S.C. § 301, but it has caused more confusion than clarity, and is not the 
exclusive means of copyright preemption.  I therefore focus here on the Supremacy Clause analysis.  For 
a more developed discussion of Section 301 preemption, see ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 161–64; Jennifer 
E. Rothman, Copyright Preemption and the Right of Publicity, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 199, 225–36 (2002). 
 164. ROTHMAN, supra note 1 passim. 
Figure 5.  Screen Shot of Cliff and Norm, 
Cheers: Norm and Cliff’s Excellent Adventure, 
(NBC television broadcast Dec. 6, 1990). 
 
Figure 6.  Photograph of Hank and Bob robots 
at Detroit Airport Bar. Photograph by William 
Archie, in Celcilia Deck, A Round for Robots, 
DETROIT FREE PRESS, Feb. 12, 1991, at 1E. 
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There will be tough cases in which the right of publicity and copyright clash, 
particularly in the context of derivative works.  Often, however, the right of publicity 
will be limited by contract, or the uses at issue will exceed the scope of initial 
consent.  When this is not the case, or it is unclear, courts will need to carefully 
consider the impact on the copyright system of allowing right of publicity claims to 
proceed.  Better understanding why we have a right of publicity, and what work it 
should be doing is essential to navigate these conflicts.  But the first step in fixing 
the current misguided approach is to recognize that the right of publicity is a very 
different claim than that of copyright law, with different motivations and interests at 
stake.  The second step is to remember that federal law should reign supreme when 
it comes into conflict with a state law.  This will not happen every time the two laws 
clash, but courts must be cognizant of when the right of publicity is 
unconstitutionally disruptive of the broader copyright system―something I develop 
further in my book.165 
VII. IMPLICATIONS 
So what do we do now about this turn to treating the right of publicity as an 
intellectual property right, and the challenges that have followed in its wake?  We 
now know that the turn took place because of a series of missteps, misunderstandings 
(both intentional and accidental), and a good bit of serendipity.  The right of privacy 
was not deficient when the Supreme Court heard Zacchini’s case, and the law might 
have been better off if the Supreme Court had simply left things as they were.  But, 
at this point, we likely cannot turn the ship around, nor can we be certain that doing 
so would lead us to a better port.  
Nevertheless, there are still useful and important insights that flow from the 
recognition that this turn in the right of publicity was not preordained, nor necessarily 
appropriate.  Going forward, even if we understand the right of publicity as an 
intellectual property right, we cannot simply leave things there.  We need to engage 
more deeply with why we have a right of publicity, and what objectives it seeks to 
further.  We should question which objectives are legitimate, and consider whether 
these goals are actually furthered by the laws we have on the books.  We also need 
to think through more carefully how we match up the right of publicity against 
competing interests, without the categorization of the right as an IP right resolving 
all questions.  
The right of publicity is not just like copyright law.  The incentive rationale is not 
a convincing basis for its existence.  And the labor-reward rubric which is also often 
posited to support a right of publicity does not explain why a person should “reap all 
the rewards of uses of her identity.  Those with lucrative personalities are likely not 
the only ones who created the value in their identities.”166  In addition, this 
basis―like that in other IP contexts―provides little guidance as to what the right of 
publicity’s boundaries should be.  “To the extent that the unjust enrichment rationale 
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holds up as a basis for entitlement to (some) of the (monetary) rewards for uses of 
one’s identity, it provides little to no guidance as to what the right of publicity’s 
boundaries should be, or when uses are just or unjust.”167  
There will be many instances in which we wish to encourage the use of other 
people’s identities.  “Public figures and celebrities are part of our culture and uses of 
their identities are often necessary and appropriate, rather than unjust.”168  The 
question is when are the uses just or unjust.  In the context of Zacchini, we were 
arguably in a circumstance in which we were far from a close call―one in which a 
performer’s “entire act” was allegedly used in a substitutionary way that could 
disrupt his ability to make a living.  But many of the problematic decisions in right 
of publicity cases, and in IP cases more broadly, stem from a presumption that if any 
profit is made from another’s identity or work, only the identity-holder, copyright 
holder, patent holder, or trademark owner should profit.169 
The failure of the common justifications for IP laws to justify most of today’s 
right of publicity laws reveals that the very best justifications for the right of publicity 
are the same ones that were central to the adoption of the right of privacy―ones 
rooted in personal liberty, dignity, and the prevention of likely economic, 
reputational, professional, and emotional injuries to identity-holders.170  Starting on 
a clean slate we would not need an independent right of publicity―both it and the 
right of privacy seek to protect and further the same interests―but there is no point 
in trying to fix that turn in the law at this point.  Nor is the treatment of the right of 
publicity as a form of IP likely to be altered.  Nevertheless, the right of publicity’s 
differences and unique qualities even under an IP umbrella should be highlighted, 
and its justifications and contours should be challenged, even if its existence is not.  
The recognition of privacy and publicity’s commonalities could also help harmonize 
publicity laws across the states, and ideally harmonize how the First Amendment and 
other defenses to such claims are analyzed.  
The history of the development of the right of publicity, and some compelling 
justifications behind both it and the right of privacy lead me to strongly support 
having a right of publicity or similar privacy-based laws, rather than to question the 
legitimacy of their existence.  Nor do I think trademark and unfair competition laws 
could stand in for right of publicity laws, at least not outside instances in which the 
primary complaint is one of false endorsement.  It is appropriate to have a broader 
law that limits nonconsensual uses of another’s identity, even if no one is confused 
about sponsorship or participation.  And a trademark-oriented rubric would often 
leave without a remedy those who lack a commercially-valuable personality.  
 
 167. Id. at 109. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id., at 105–12, 155–59 & passim; Stacy L. Dogan, Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing 
Gum:  Publicity as a Legal Right, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE EDGE:  THE CONTESTED 
CONTOURS OF IP 17–18 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg eds., 2014) (criticizing reliance 
on an unjust enrichment approach to publicity rights, rather than a “harms-based approach”); cf. Mark A. 
Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031 (2005) (criticizing the 
contention that intellectual property owners should be able to capture all value derived from their 
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Recognizing that there are some convincing justifications for having a right of 
publicity leads me to conclude that right of publicity laws should actually be doing 
more work in some places.  This is particularly true when private figures are 
involved, such as in the context of revenge porn, uses on mugshot sites, some 
instances of unauthorized livestreaming, and some uses by Facebook and Groupon, 
such as in nonconsensual advertising.  Right of publicity laws also could play a role 
in addressing some deep fakes, and other nonconsensual digital reanimation that 
could substitute for performances by living actors. 
At the same time, the right of publicity should be narrowed in other places.  The 
right should not be a transferable one that can be taken away or transferred to others.  
The mere evocation (rather than use) of a person’s identity without evidence of 
confusion as to endorsement or actual participation should not be actionable.  And 
the First Amendment and copyright preemption should offer more robust defenses 
against publicity claims than they often do today.  The addition of some statutory fair 
use-like protections and exemptions could also help matters. 
When it comes to postmortem rights, we should recognize that very different 
issues are raised than in the context of uses of the living.  Before granting postmortem 
rights for decades, sometimes centuries after death, we need to think more deeply 
about why we want such laws, and what work they should be doing.  Current versions 
of these laws allow for companies held by those unrelated to heirs to reap windfalls 
at the expense of the public, while our current estate tax system forces 
commercialization of the deceased against the wishes of both the dead and their heirs.  
These laws also unduly limit speech about famous and important public figures in 
very troublesome ways.  There may be reasons to provide a limited postmortem 
period of protection for a person’s identity, especially in the aftermath of a person’s 
death, but the laws should not be crafted as they are now, nor should we have fifty 
different approaches to doing so.171 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Recognizing the harmony (rather than the divergence) of the right of publicity and 
the right of privacy is instructive.  After the split with privacy law, the right of 
publicity became unmoored and we lost the thread of its justifications, leading to it 
being expanded without knowing why or how to limit it.  The shift also led some 
courts to exclude those without commercially-valuable identities from its 
protections.  At the same time, the split led privacy law to narrow for the worse.  
Privacy law and the “right to be let alone” became focused on private figures, 
seclusion, secrecy, and injured feelings, rather than on the broader frame rooted in 
autonomy and dignity with which it had originated, and that included protections for 
both public and private figures alike.  
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By suggesting that the differences between the right of publicity and the right of 
privacy have long been misunderstood and misconstrued, I do not intend to suggest 
that today’s privacy law provides all the answers, nor do I think it likely that states 
will suddenly see the light and (re)integrate the right of publicity with privacy law.  
Nor would doing so magically solve the fundamental conflicts between limits on 
being able to use a person’s name, likeness, or voice, and the First Amendment right 
to do so.  Conflicts with both free speech and copyright law have existed since 
privacy laws were first adopted.  The shift to the IP rubric is not the sole cause of the 
problems surrounding the right of publicity, nor is a return to a privacy-based rubric 
a panacea.  Instead, my book and this Lecture are the first steps to rethinking what is 
at issue in right of publicity cases.  We need to disrupt the common treatment of the 
right as akin to copyright, and recognize that both its origins and motivations are 
quite different.  
In addition, the right of publicity’s placement in the IP framework highlights some 
of the shortcomings in how we treat IP law itself more broadly, from the lesser 
scrutiny of restrictions on speech, to the strong thumb on the scale for expanding and 
protecting IP.  Many have criticized these impulses throughout IP law, and they are 
amplified in the context of right of publicity laws.  All IP laws would benefit from 
more modesty in scope, and greater recognition of the value of speech using other 
people’s intellectual property.   
Today, the right of publicity is a “misshapen, bloated monster.”172  It is both too 
broad, and too narrow, and in many of the wrong places.  But, properly understood 
and designed, the right of publicity could become an effective tool to address a 
number of twenty-first century challenges, not just for successful celebrities who are 
already winning at life’s lottery, but for everyone from struggling actors to average 
citizens. 
My goal has not been to present a model right of publicity law, but to clear out 
the erroneous understandings of it, and provide a foundation for rebuilding it. Where 
we go after this is likely to be a matter of debate and some disagreement and 
divergence.  Just as more than one hundred years ago people began to complain when 
their names and likenesses appeared without their permission on products, 
advertisements, and, yes, in newspapers, in part because of changes in technology at 
the time, today’s digital age is leading to new calls for change.  The right of publicity 
provides an opportunity, as well as some dangers, going forward.  My reset button 
provides us with a clear foundation to build this next generation of laws. 
When Columbia holds its next right of publicity symposium, say in another 
twenty-five years, I am certain that challenges and disagreements will remain.  At 
that time, however, I hope that the discussion of the right of publicity’s goals and 
history will not be the same-old, same-old, but instead will be informed and 
influenced by the true story of the right of publicity.  
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